Global Overview 2015
People internally displaced by conflict and violence
Based on IDMC's monitoring of displacement caused by conflict and violence between January and December 2014.
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People internally displaced by conflict and violence

May 2015
With thanks

Our work would not be possible without the generous contributions of our funding partners. IDMC would like to thank them for their continuous support in 2014. We extend our particular thanks to the following:

Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT), EuropeAid, Liechtenstein’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the UN Agency for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and our other donors.

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Printing: Imprimerie Harder

Cover photo: Displaced people from minority Yazidi sect, fleeing violence from forces loyal to Islamic State in Sinjar town, walk towards Syrian border, on outskirts of Sinjar mountain (Photo: © STRINGER Iraq / Reuters, August 2014).

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

The Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has monitored internal displacement since 1998. Our annual Global Overview covers people forced to flee their homes by international or internal armed conflict as well as generalised violence – be it communal, ethnic, political or criminal. This report is based on data and analysis gathered between January and December 2014 in 60 countries and territories across the world.

Our research shows that the causes and impacts of displacement are multiple and often overlapping, including those related to disasters induced by natural hazards, which we report on separately.

Chapter 1 of the report describes the scale and main trends, causes and impacts of displacement worldwide in 2014.

We have made changes to the chapters that follow to make this year’s report more streamlined and accessible, and to focus the publication on protracted displacement, given that it was a key issue in 53 of the 60 countries and territories we monitored in 2014 and that it is a salient issue on policy agendas worldwide.

Chapter 2 describes internal displacement worldwide, but instead of specific entries for each country hosting internally displaced people (IDPs) as in previous editions this year we have grouped them into eight regions: the Americas, central Africa, east Africa, west Africa, the Middle East and north Africa, Europe, the Caucasus and central Asia, south Asia, and south-east Asia. Each section touches on the displacement situation in individual countries and in the region as a whole. This chapter also includes seven country spotlights on protracted displacement, which highlight specific challenges related to the issue in each of these countries.

Chapter 3 takes a close look at protracted displacement. It pinpoints the main blockages to overcoming protracted displacement, from lack of political will to the absence of a shared and actionable definition of protracted displacement. Drawing on our global monitoring, it identifies features and dynamics of protracted displacement worldwide as a basis for more informed action.

We have included a new chapter (Chapter 4) on the methodological challenges of gathering figures and information on internal displacement. It outlines data shortfalls and requirements, and looks at potential ways of assessing and describing the phenomenon more accurately worldwide.

The report also includes a table of figures for each of the countries and territories monitored. These figures estimate the total number of people living in internal displacement as of December 2014. This includes both the number of people newly displaced and people displaced in previous years. Estimates of new displacement in 2014 and of reported returns of IDPs to their homes are also provided in separate columns in the table. Due to differences in reporting by our sources, in some cases our new displacement figures reflect the total number of people displaced during the year, whereas in others they reflect only the number of people that remained in displacement at the year’s end. With regard to return figures, reliable data on IDP returns is not available in the majority of cases and actual return figures may be considerably higher.

It is also important to note that IDPs reported as having returned to their places of origin may not necessarily have achieved durable solutions to their displacement. Those who choose to integrate locally in their places of refuge or to settle elsewhere in the country are seldom monitored, meaning little information is available on their number or fate.

To produce our Global Overview, we compiled and analysed the best data available from national governments, the UN and other international agencies, national and international NGOs, human rights organisations, media reports and IDPs themselves. We also undertook field missions to 29 countries during 2014.

The availability of better data may have contributed to changes in figures for 2014 compared with previous years, alongside actual increases or decreases in the scale of displacement.

We also report for the first time on four countries where new displacement took place or where data on internal displacement became available: Cameroon, El Salvador, Papua New Guinea and Ukraine.

Our estimates are rounded up or down to the nearest 100. We state “up to” when we have reason to believe that the reported figures may be overestimates. This is often because only old source data is available and we have evidence that displacement has abated since. If we believe the reported figures to be an underestimate, we state “at least”. This may be because the source data does not cover all areas affected by displacement.

Countries in which the number of IDPs fell to zero during the year are included in the data table and the change explained on page 82. Those that had no IDPs reported for a second consecutive year in 2014 are not included. Kyrgyzstan is the only such example.

We use UN Population Fund (UNFPA) figures to normalise our estimates. We do this because other population figures are unreliable for some of the countries we monitor, and using them would not yield comparable percentages. UNFPA’s statistics can be found online at http://www.unfpa.org/swp.

For the purposes of this report, we include Papua New Guinea in the south-east Asia region; Afghanistan in the south Asia region; Turkey, Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Europe, the Caucasus and central Asia; Zimbabwe in the east Africa region; and Mexico, Central, and South America in the Americas region. Any boundaries, names or other designations shown on maps or elsewhere do not imply our official endorsement or acceptance of them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-east Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>JIPS</td>
<td>Joint IDP Profiling Service</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>NSAGs</td>
<td>Non-State Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<td>USCR</td>
<td>United States Committee for Refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants or USCRI since 2004)</td>
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</table>
I am Abo Hassan, a farmer from Al-Zaidan village, near Abu Ghraib. I used to live and work as a farmer with my relatives, we owned together 20 acres. In 2006, after the bombing of Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra, we started to get threats. It started by hinting indirectly that we are not accepted in the village anymore. Then we started to see threatening words on the walls of the houses. Then it became more serious when several attempts were made to kill members of our families.

The message was very clear; leave now or be killed. We had difficulty in leaving the village to Baghdad as the main road at that time was not safe and we had to take the chance anyway.

I live with my relatives in this informal settlement of Al Qudus in Nissan District, since then.

Our houses in Al-Zaidan village were destroyed but I cannot sell the land because of a tribal chastisement preventing it. I cannot go back there, I went to see what became of it only once, hiding among a big group of visiting people but this rare opportunity, I can only take in very limited times.

Now I live in this place because I cannot sell my land to buy somewhere else and replace it. I started a paper work few years ago to get a compensation for the destroyed houses, but then at the police station they told me that the paperwork was lost, leaving us with nothing and still in limbo.
A displaced child stands in an aircraft hanger amidst military helicopters at the M’Poko Air Force base where thousands of Muslims have taken shelter in Bangui, Central African Republic. Following violence that has largely split communities along religious lines, tens of thousands are displaced in the capital alone. Photo: OCHA/Phil Moore, February 2014.
As of the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to flee their homes by armed conflict and generalised violence, and were living in displacement within the borders of their own country. This represents a 15 per cent increase on 2013, and includes 11 million people who were newly displaced during the year, the equivalent of 30,000 people a day.

Never in the last 10 years of IDMC’s global reporting, from the peak of the Darfur crisis in 2004 and the sectarian violence in Iraq in the mid to late 2000s to the uprisings of the “Arab spring” in 2011 and the ensuing crises in the Middle East have we reported such a high estimate for the number of people newly displaced in a year. Today there are almost twice as many IDPs as there are refugees worldwide.

The majority of the increase since last year is the result of the protracted crises in Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria. The five countries accounted for 60 per cent of new displacement worldwide, and in all except Nigeria more than a million people fled their homes during the year.

Two countries we reported on for the first time in 2014 - Ukraine, where displacement took place for the first time, and El Salvador, where data became available for the first time - accounted for at least 935,400 new displacements between them. The figure for Ukraine alone was at least 646,500.

Iraq suffered most new displacement, with at least 2.2 million people fleeing from areas that fell under Islamic State (ISIL) control. Heavy fighting in South Sudan displaced at least 1.3 million, particularly in the states of Unity, Jonglei, Lakes and Upper Nile. More than 11 per cent of the
Syria, but Libya’s displaced population also increased more than six-fold to at least 400,000.

In sub-Saharan Africa, there were 11.4 million IDPs across 22 countries, with Sudan accounting for at least 3.1 million, DRC 2.8 million, South Sudan 1.5 million, Somalia 1.1 million and Nigeria at least a million. Central Africa was again the region worst-affected by new displacement, accounting for 70 per cent of the sub-Saharan total of 11.4 million.

More than three million people were forced to flee conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, South Sudan and Sudan, and Boko Haram’s ruthless campaign to establish an independent Islamic state in north-eastern Nigeria also drove significant new displacement. It was responsible for displacing more than three-quarters of at least 975,300 people in the country during the year, while many others fled inter-communal violence in the Middle Belt region.

Figures for the Americas remained relatively stable, but high. The vast ma-

Key regional trends in 2014

In the Middle East and north Africa, 3.8 million people were newly displaced in 2014, a nine per cent increase on the year before that brought the overall number of IDPs to 11.9 million, or 31 per cent of the global total. More than 90 per cent of the region’s IDPs were living in Iraq and Syria, but Libya’s displaced population also increased more than six-fold to at least 400,000.

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Figures for the Americas remained relatively stable, but high. The vast ma-

country’s population was newly displaced during the year.

With no end in sight, Syria’s civil war forced at least 1.1 million people to flee their homes, and at least a million were newly displaced in DRC by low-intensity conflict and violence in the east of the country, and a series of brutal incidents such as the Beni massacres in North Kivu province.

The ten countries with the highest numbers of IDPs accounted for 77 per cent of the total displacement figure in 2014.

In terms of the scale of displacement relative to countries’ population size, at least 35 per cent of Syria’s population, or 7.6 million people, have been displaced.’ This makes it the country with the largest number of IDPs in the world, accounting for 20 per cent of the global total.

Syria’s displacement crisis is ongoing and escalating, but Cyprus shows how events long past can continue to influence the demographic fabric of a smaller country. The 1974 coup and subsequent Turkish invasion forced up to 265,000 people to flee their homes, and the figure has remained at as many as 212,400 since 2001 because the Cypriot government counts those displaced in areas under its control and their descendants as IDPs. They make up a fifth of the island’s population.

Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria accounted for 60 per cent of new displacement worldwide.
Internal displacement in 2014

The cumulative total also decreased slightly to 855,000 IDPs, making it the region with the lowest overall figure as of the end of 2014.

Internal displacement in a changing world

The steady increase in the number of IDPs over the past ten years reflects the changing nature of conflict worldwide. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the old east-west divide, opposition forces have increasingly challenged traditional western powers.

Inequality is also on the rise, creating extreme disparities in wealth, education and other areas of human development. This has led to the increasing marginalisation of certain geographic areas, typically those far from political and economic capitals, and the rising up of formerly repressed sectors of society who lack political representation and seek greater independence, power and control.

These factors have led to the emer-

Graph 1.1: IDPs and refugees from 1989 to 2014

Sources: IDMC, USCR (IDP figures); UNHCR, UNRWA (refugee figures)
gence of a growing array of NSAGs. Today, significant displacement is caused by such groups throughout the world, from ISIL in the Middle East and al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa to separatist forces in eastern Ukraine and criminal groups in Latin America, as well as the military operations mounted against them. Issues of poverty, increasing inequality and social frustration also form the backdrop to Boko Haram’s emergence and expansion in Nigeria.

Today’s armed conflicts put civilians in harm’s way as never before, the result of an abundant flow of weapons, warring parties’ failure to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and the increasingly asymmetrical nature of conflict. Counter-insurgency operations have eroded the distinction between combatants and civilians, who are often clubbed together with the “terrorists”. Those living in opposition-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria have been targeted with the aim of driving them out and depriving NSAGs of potential sources of support.

**Conflict in one country can have regional implications, creating a “domino effect” on its neighbours**

Our analysis also shows that conflict in one country can have regional implications, creating a “domino effect” on its neighbours. The phenomenon has been visible in the Middle East since 2011, and is also a defining feature in west and central Africa. Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, for example, has been active in CAR, DRC and South Sudan over the last five years and has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Nigeria’s internal conflict spilled over and caused internal displacement in Cameroon and Niger in 2014.

As displaced populations become ever more dispersed in areas where it is harder for humanitarians to reach them - whether because of government restrictions, security concerns or the fact that IDPs are all but invisible in urban areas - the task of assisting them increasingly falls to their host communities. The current humanitarian system, however, is not well set up to offer them the support they need. Such an arrangement may be manageable in the short term, but over time IDPs may...
“outstay their welcome”, putting additional pressure on already scarce resources and creating tensions between them and their hosts, which in turn have the potential to fuel further conflict and displacement.

The world’s population is set to reach 9.6 billion by 2050 and the burgeoning growth rate combined with rising inequality, lack of democratic representation and competition for territory and resources has left religious, ethnic and tribal minorities particularly marginalised and therefore vulnerable to targeted attacks and displacement. This pattern is visible in the composition of displaced populations throughout the world, from Colombia, where 30 per cent of new IDPs in 2014 came from African-Colombian communities; to Ukraine, where Crimean Tatars and Roma have been discriminated against both in their places of origin and refuge; and Sri Lanka, where ethnic Tamils make up the overwhelming majority of remaining IDPs.

**Protracted displacement**

In 2014, there were people living in displacement for ten years or more in nearly 90 per cent of the 60 countries and territories we monitored. This phenomenon of protracted displacement is largely responsible for the high and ever-growing cumulative figures we publish each year. The majority of protracted displacement is the result of a failure to anchor IDPs’ return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in broader development and peace-building programmes. In a fifth of the countries we monitor the weakness or absence of the state is also a key factor, as in CAR, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, all of which host large numbers of IDPs.

Many people living in protracted displacement have also been forced to flee more than once in their lives. People already displaced by conflict and violence before 2014 were forced to uproot their lives again during the year in a third of the countries we monitor. More than 80 per cent of those affected fled to escape further exposure to conflict or generalised violence in their places of refuge. In DRC’s Kivu provinces, most IDPs have been displaced more than once.

Most of those living in protracted displacement made no visible progress in 2014 against the eight criteria set out in the IASC framework for durable solu-
Government preferences on settlement options contributed to prolonging displacement in a fifth of cases, as in Burundi, Sudan and Azerbaijan.

**Economic vulnerability and weak governance**
Countries where new displacement took place in 2014 were among the most economically vulnerable and least able to cope with a crisis. Figure 1.3 measures poverty and economic decline (left) and uneven development (right) against a country’s coping capacity; understood as its institutional strength or weakness and the state of its infrastructure. As shown in figure 1.3, those with poor coping capacity and high indices of poverty, economic decline and uneven development are clustered in the top right-hand corner of both figures. With only a few exceptions, countries that suffered new displacement in 2014 tend to cluster in the same corner. This reveals a correlation between displacement on the one hand, and poverty and weak governance on the other. It suggests that when displacement takes place in less economically developed states, they are unlikely to have the resources and capacity to respond to IDPs’ short-term needs, let alone invest in longer-term solutions.

Crises often reveal underlying structural challenges, particularly when the displacement they cause becomes protracted.
Data disaggregated by age and sex

Data disaggregated by age and sex (SADD) was only available in 17 of the 60 countries and territories we monitored in 2014. Fully disaggregated data was available for Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kosovo, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan. The data for Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen did not include information on displaced boys and girls aged 0 to 18, or on IDPs aged 60 and over. Fully disaggregated data came from IOM’s displacement tracking matrix in Mali and Nigeria; from UNHCR and the government in Burundi, Pakistan and Kosovo; national governments in Georgia and Colombia; and the shelter and camp coordination and camp management cluster in Myanmar.

Given that SADD provides key indicators for effective and well-targeted responses, the shortage of such data constitutes a considerable obstacle to addressing IDPs’ protection and assistance needs and facilitating their pursuit of durable solutions. Without it, programming may fall short of meeting the needs of the vulnerable members of the displaced population, or even exclude them altogether.

The data available shows that the ratio of men to women among IDPs tends to match that of the general population, but with slightly more women than men (see graph 1.3). In some countries, such as Burundi and Colombia, this may be attributed to men staying longer in their areas of origin, either as fighters or to protect their family’s property and assets. They may also return earlier to assess the situation and start rebuilding their homes and livelihoods. In the absence of data, however, it is difficult to identify any conclusive global trends.

Graph 1.3: Disaggregated data: sex by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Avg. Men (inc. boys)</th>
<th>Avg. Women (inc. girls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and South-East Asia</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on IDPs tends to focus on those living in camps, camp-like settings and collective centres, who are acknowledged to make up only a small fraction of the displaced population. Increasing numbers of IDPs also flee to urban areas where they are largely invisible among the urban poor, and these two factors mean that overall this report is likely to understate the true scale of displacement.

Reports of IDPs’ return to their places of origin, local integration or settlement elsewhere also contribute to changes in our figures from year to year. Data on returns is limited, but more prevalent than for local integration and settlement elsewhere (see graph 1.2). It should also be noted that people reported as having returned may not have achieved a durable solution to their displacement. This was the case for the vast majority of the more than 909,600 IDPs who returned to their homes in the central African region.

Internal displacement in 2014
In 2014, there were people living in internal displacement caused by conflict and generalised violence in all regions monitored by IDMC. As in previous years, displacement around the world in 2014 varied in terms of its scale, causes, patterns, protection issues, prospects for durable solutions and responses, reflecting the fact that people flee their homes in diverse political and conflict contexts, and in countries with varying capacity and will to assist their IDPs. This section describes some of these salient features by region.
As of the end of 2014, there were at least seven million IDPs in South America, Central America and Mexico, a 12 per cent increase on 2013. Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru all had displaced populations, but Colombia accounted for the bulk of the regional total. The country had 6,044,200 IDPs as of the end of year, representing 12 per cent of its overall population. The figure continues to rise in part because of new displacement, and in part because people displaced in previous years continue to be registered.

Mexico and Peru had at least 281,400 and 150,000 IDPs respectively, and between them El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras had 566,700, many of them displaced by organised crime and gang violence.

There were 137,200 people newly displaced in Colombia in 2014, fewer than in 2013 though the figure is expected to rise as the victims’ registry is updated. The country’s decades-old conflict is the main cause of displacement, but spreading criminal violence has also forced people to flee their homes. A third of all incidents of armed violence reported in 2014 occurred in the Pacific coast departments of Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nariño, which also accounted for more than half of the country’s new IDPs. The departments’ African-Colombian communities were particularly hard hit, accounting for 30 per cent of the total. Colombia’s Pacific coast ports are conduits for both legal and illegal exports, and armed groups that have emerged since the demobilisation of the country’s paramilitary apparatus – post-demobilisation armed groups - continue to terrorise commu-
nities and cause displacement in these areas.

The country’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the smaller National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) accounted for the largest proportion of new displacements during the year, followed by post-demobilisation armed groups. The traditional pattern of rural to urban displacement continued, but intra-urban displacement soared, particularly in Buenaventura, where 22,400 people were displaced within the city, Cúcuta, Quibdó, Tumaco and Soacha.

In Mexico, 1,300 people newly displaced in Chiapas joined IDPs living in protracted displacement linked to the Zapatista uprising. The new displacements were caused by religious intolerance, continuing political violence against Zapatistas and resource extraction and development projects. Criminal violence displaced at least 9,000 people across ten states in 2014, including 23 mass events.

A survey in El Salvador revealed that as many as 288,900 people were displaced by criminal violence and threats in 2014. In Guatemala, drug trafficking organisations and gangs fighting for the control of territory to extract palm oil and smuggle merchandise across the country’s northern border displaced at least 1,770 families between 2011 and 2014. Of them, 350 families, or around 1,400 people, fled their homes in 2014. There was no data available for new displacements in Honduras.

A survey in El Salvador revealed that as many as 288,900 people were displaced by criminal violence and threats in 2014.

Displacement in Colombia is still driven by the armed conflict, which continues despite the ongoing peace process. There have been fewer hostilities between government forces and FARC, and peace negotiators reached a partial agreement on drug trafficking in 2014, but violence and insecurity are still rife. Widespread abuses, including the recruitment of minors, sexual violence, the deployment of anti-personnel mines, extortion and the targeting of human rights defenders and land restitution advocates have forced many people to flee their homes. Forty-eight per cent of IDPs are aged between six and 26, and many continue to live in areas still affected by the conflict.

The main cause of displacement in Mexico and the Northern Triangle was criminal violence mostly related to drug trafficking and gang activity. NSAGs use violence in the pursuit of profit, territorial control over trafficking routes and to neutralise competing organisations, often in collaboration with the state. Post-demobilisation armed groups in Colombia; maras and other urban gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; and drug traffickers and other criminal groups in Mexico were responsible for thousands of civilian deaths and kidnappings, the terrorising of local populations, extortion rackets, threats and the corruption and intimidation of government officials, all of which led to displacement.

Forced dispossession were most common in Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala. They were driven by both the legal and illegal extraction of resources in all three countries, including logging, the cultivation of coca, opium poppy, marijuana and crops for biofuels and palm oil. In Colombia, such activities have also complicated land rights issues in indigenous and African-Colombian areas and created obstacles to restitution. Vigilantes have contributed to increasing violence in Mexico and Guatemala as people take up arms to defend themselves.

Heavy-handed responses by state security forces continue in Mexico and the Northern Triangle. Crackdowns by military police in Honduras and joint military operations in Mexico have increased human rights violations, particularly extrajudicial executions, the targeted killing of women, forced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detentions. Twenty-two alleged criminals were shot dead in Tlatlaya in the state of Mexico in June, 43 trainee teachers were killed or disappeared in Guerrero state in September and at least 1,000 bodies were discovered in mass graves in Mexico and hundreds more in El Salvador during the year.

The involvement of security forces and public officials in such abuses is well documented, but very few perpetrators have been brought to justice. Violations such as these perpetrated by State agents contribute to the climate of insecurity that leads people into displacement.

The main cause of displacement in Mexico and the Northern Triangle was criminal violence mostly related to drug trafficking and gang activity.

Gender-based violence (GBV), forced recruitment, political violence and religious intolerance are widespread in the region and continue to cause displacement. Unaccompanied girls aged between 12 and 17 have fled to the US from the Northern Triangle and Mexico as a result of rape, physical violence and the threat of human trafficking. Violence, insecurity and endemic poverty had driven 21,500 young people from the Northern Triangle and 18,800 from Mexico as of the end of 2013, of whom around 23 per cent were girls with international protection needs. In Colombia, post-demobilisation armed groups were responsible for most of the GBV cases Human Rights Watch reported in 2014.

Political activists, human rights advocates and journalists who expose officials’ abuse of power, embezzlement and criminal activities have been killed, persecuted and repressed and have fled their homes in all five countries. Indigenous communities have also been persecuted and displaced from their ancestral homelands in Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala.

Since 2006, Mexico’s “abuse-riddled war on drugs” has driven severe human rights violations, including extrajudicial
Displacement patterns and protection issues

The mobility and fragmentation of drug trafficking and other criminal groups as a result of military operations against them, and their struggles to control territory mean that displacement patterns in Mexico are changeable and diverse. People have been displaced en masse and in trickles, whether from one urban area to another, as in Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and Veracruz; rural and semi-rural to suburban areas, as in Chiapas, Michoacán, Oaxaca and Sinaloa; suburban to urban areas, as in Michoacán and Sinaloa; urban to suburban areas, as in Veracruz; and intra-urban, as in Chalco, Nezahualcóyotl, Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Mexico City.

In El Salvador and Guatemala, the sweeping political transitions that took place at the end of their civil wars have been followed by waves of crime and insecurity. Internal displacement and undocumented migration to the US are a direct consequence of structural problems that drive forced movements and prevent the achievement of durable solutions.

A substantial proportion of criminal violence in the Northern Triangle is attributed to the transnational Mara Salvatrucha criminal gang, which originated in Los Angeles, and Barrio 18 or Neighbourhood 18. Both are involved in street-level drug dealing and extortion rackets. The government in El Salvador agreed a truce with the two gangs in 2012, but it was effectively abandoned in 2014, leading to a rise in homicides, extortion and the recruitment of children.34 None of the countries in the Northern Triangle have published official data on displacement, but evidence suggests that families and young people regularly flee areas appropriated by criminal gangs such as these two to escape their excesses.35

Internal displacement and undocumented migration to the US are a direct consequence of structural problems that drive forced movements

In Guatemala, military operations against criminal gangs continued in 2014 in the Pacific coast departments of Escuintla and Santa Rosa, and along the border with Honduras in Zacapa and Chiquimula. Maras are ubiquitous in many areas of Guatemala City and in the nearby municipalities of Villa Nueva and Mixco, where people live in a state of perpetual fear. As in Mexico, attacks and intimidation against human rights defenders and journalists, particularly those covering corruption and drugs trade, are common and go unpunished.36 An opinion poll carried out by Vanderbilt University found that between 2012 and 2014 the percentage of Guatemalans who felt the need to move because of their fear of crime had risen from 9.91 to 13.44 per cent.37

In Honduras, nearly 65 per cent of the population live in poverty and the unemployment rate is 4.5 per cent.38 The city of San Pedro Sula has the highest homicide rate in the world, with 171 per 100,000 inhabitants. Homicides in the country more generally are concentrated in the larger cities and northern areas leading to the border with Guatemala, where drug trafficking routes are in dispute.39 Domestic and gang violence are rampant and have been reported as the main reasons for children and young people fleeing Honduras for the US.40 Those deported swell the ranks of gangs and other criminal groups, and the 6,000 children living on the streets to escape domestic violence are also easy prey for recruiters.41 The deployment of the military police to counter violence in 2014 had the opposite effect, increasing insecurity, abuses and corruption.42

No new data on IDPs in Honduras was available for 2014, but areas previously identified as suffering displacement include the departments of Francisco Morazán, Cortes and El Paraíso.43 Displacements have taken place from suburban to urban areas, such as from Chamelecón to Tegucigalpa, and from rural to suburban areas. Intra-urban displacement has occurred in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.

In El Salvador, at least 91 families were reportedly displaced from La Paz, Sonsonate, Zacatecoluca, and Usulután. Mass displacements have been caused by fighting between gangs in San Salvador and by the struggle to control territory in Ciudad Delgado,44 but most IDPs in the country appear to flee in small numbers.45

Durable solutions

In Colombia, IDPs who live in contested areas and those controlled by NSAGs are exposed to human rights abuses and live in dire circumstances, with inadequate housing, scarce employment opportunities and no access to public services.46 Displacement also drives people into poverty. More than 63 per cent of IDPs live below the poverty line, and 33 per cent live in extreme poverty.47

Land restitution is becoming increasingly important and is a key element of the peace talks, but progress on the issue is slow. Threats against the leaders of those claiming restitution have been reported in 25 of the country’s 32 departments, with 600 people affected since January 2012. Authorities have determined that more
than 400 threatened claimants and leaders are at *extraordinary risk* because of their involvement in the issue.\(^4\)

In Mexico, 30,000 IDPs have been living in protracted displacement in Chiapas since the 1994 to 1995 Zapatista conflict, with no durable solutions in sight. The Chiapas state legislature enacted a law on IDPs in 2012, but no steps have been taken to implement it. Instead IDPs’ rights have been ignored for two decades, with widespread injustice, discrimination, poverty, persecution and impunity preventing their return to their places of origin.\(^4\)

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have only recently begun to acknowledge displacement and set responses in motion, and as such the pursuit of durable solutions is still virtually non-existent.

**National and international response**

Responses to displacement vary significantly across the region from Colombia, where the government and international agencies have been running programmes for many years, to the Northern Triangle where responses are barely under way. Colombia made significant progress at the judicial, legal and institutional level in 2014, implementing transitional justice mechanisms, and policies on durable solutions and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration. Assistance programmes for IDPs also continued but had little impact, particularly in terms of access to employment.\(^4\) Colombia is a pilot country for the Transitional Solutions Initiative, a joint UNHCR, UNDP and World Bank project running in 17 communities,\(^4\) but it is too soon to assess results.

Mexico does not officially acknowledge internal displacement, and responses have been fragmentary and insufficient. The country enacted a federal victims’ law in 2013, intended to ensure justice, protection and reparations. Nineteen states have incorporated the legislation into their statutes, but as of December 2014, only nine were in compliance with the federal law, which limits local responses. In Guerrero, the state with the highest rate of new displacement in 2014, a law on IDPs was enacted in July.

In the same month, the Executive Commission for the Assistance of Victims (known by its Spanish acronym CEAV) declared forced internal displacement in itself an act of violence that requires special attention and a differentiated response.\(^4\) This is an important step forward, because it allows victims to join the federal registry of victims. As of December 2014, 15 displaced families from Chihuahua had joined the federal registry, and 300 in Sinaloa were in process of registering at the state level. This is the only sign Mexican authorities have shown of recognising the phenomenon at the national level. That said, CEAV’s capacity to intervene and grant reparations is extremely limited. It works with a meagre budget and has no comprehensive programme or protocol to deal with IDPs.

Responses to displacement vary significantly across the region.

In Peru, at least 150,000 people who fled their homes during the 1980 to 1990 armed conflict are still living in protracted displacement. They have been unable to integrate locally into their host communities because of a lack of livelihood and education opportunities and language barriers.\(^4\) Their access to reparation, compensation and relocation programmes has also been limited.

None of the Northern Triangle countries has adopted a national law on displacement, and the Guatemalan government is reticent even to officially acknowledge the phenomenon. Honduras has established an inter-institutional commission for IDPs’ protection, which began work in March 2014. In collaboration with JIPS and UNHCR it is studying and mapping displacement as a first step towards a coordinated response. Meanwhile, however, impoverished and vulnerable IDPs living on the fringes of main urban centres receive no assistance. Fifteen local NGOs have formed a network under the leadership of the Centre for the Investigation and Protection of Human Rights (known by its Spanish acronym CIPRODEH) to assist IDPs and advocate for a comprehensive national policy on displacement.

El Salvador and Honduras signed collaboration agreements with UNHCR in 2013 to support their responses to displacement. In April 2014 the Central American Integration System (known by its Spanish acronym SICA) signed an agreement, also with UNHCR, which will serve as a framework to promote the rights of refugees, unaccompanied children and IDPs in the region.\(^4\)

**The Cartagena + 30 process and IDPs in the Americas**

2014 marked the 30th anniversary of the landmark 1984 Cartagena declaration on refugees in Latin America. In the run-up to the ministerial meeting in Brazil at the end of the year, governments, civil society, humanitarian agencies and academics held four sub-regional and regional meetings to discuss the main challenges in the region, including responses to internal displacement.

Civil society organisations were particularly concerned about the detention and deportation of unaccompanied minors at the US-Mexico border, and the plight of the IDPs in the region more generally. They acknowledged “new” non-state groups and generalised violence as the key drivers of internal and cross-border displacement. The sub-regional discussions focused on the multiple causes of the phenomenon and the need to include IDPs and refugees in discussions that affect their lives and to give specific attention to the most vulnerable groups.\(^4\)

Participants also called for Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries to adopt the Guiding Principles and incorporate them into their statutes, meet international standards of assistance and reparation, introduce effective prevention and monitoring mechanisms, and to work within UNHCR’s durable solutions framework. There were also calls for greater burden sharing, solidarity and cooperation in the region.

The Brazil summit produced an action plan on asylum, unaccompanied minors and refugees, but not for IDPs and their protection. Despite its prevalence elsewhere in the region, internal displacement caused by criminal violence was only recognised as an issue in the Northern Triangle, and Mexico was not included in proposals for a new human rights observatory on displacement.\(^4\)
Colombia’s experience brings the challenges of resolving protracted displacement amid ongoing violence into sharp focus, even in a middle-income country with a strong legal framework for IDPs’ protection.

According to official statistics, at least six million people have been displaced over more than six decades of conflict. In 2014, 137,200 people were newly displaced, 403,700 registered as IDPs displaced in 2014 and previous years and 7,100 were forcibly evicted. More than 50 per cent of IDPs live in informal urban settlements.

Displacement happens throughout the country, but is highly concentrated along the Pacific coast and the border with Venezuela.

The ongoing peace process between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia can contribute to ending protracted displacement.

A partial agreement on the drugs trade was reached in May, and nearly 29,000 former combatants were assisted under the government’s reintegration programme between October 2013 and September 2014. There has been little improvement, however, in overall security.

The conflict rumbles on, and at least 40 criminal gangs, many of which have morphed out of post-demobilisation armed groups, fight over urban territory. They terrorise the civilian population with killings, disappearances, torture, extortion, intimidation and sexual violence, and drive intra-urban displacement, particularly in Bogotá, Buenaventura, Cúcuta, Quibdó and Tumaco.

IDPs in areas under BACRIM control are highly vulnerable and live in dire circumstances with inadequate housing, scarce employment and no access to public services.

Public opinion remains divided over whether the peace process will succeed. Re-establishing trust, particularly in institutions, the rule of law and the security forces is paramount, and key to upholding IDPs’ and other victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation.

Colombia has made significant progress in addressing displacement at the judicial, legal and institutional level, and particularly protracted displacement. Transitional justice mechanisms, incipient durable solutions and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration policies have been implemented. Efforts are hampered, however, by rampant insecurity and structural obstacles, and victims’ reparations have been slow to materialise.

The Constitutional Court and local tri-
The passing of draft bills 022 and 129 of 2014 would increase the jurisdiction of military and police tribunals to try human rights abuses and violations of international human rights law by the security forces, and as such would be a setback to the transitional justice system.

Property restitution is key to resolving protracted displacement, but in Colombia it has become a source of conflict. In the first three months of 2014, 16 major displacements took place in priority restitution areas. Since 2011, 64,815 requests for land restitution have been lodged, but as of the end of June 2014 only 2,687 had been granted.

Land grabs and forced evictions associated with large infrastructure and resource extraction projects continue to cause displacement, particularly of indigenous people, African-Colombians and farmers. Corrupt local authorities, notaries and businesspeople, and the presence of illegal armed groups have hampered restitution. Human rights advocates, land activists and community leaders have been killed and threatened.

Ninety-two per cent of IDPs live below the poverty line, of whom 33 per cent live in extreme poverty, which reflects the lack of support they receive in trying to re-establish their lives. Of those who applied for government assistance to return or relocate, only 26 per cent have achieved their goals, of whom only 15 per cent felt the process had been conducted with dignity.

UNHCR, UNDP and the Colombian authorities are running the Transitional Solutions Initiative with 17 displaced communities, involving their return to rural areas, local integration in urban areas and relocation schemes. Despite the legal and institutional frameworks in place, the strength of the government and the long-standing presence of international humanitarian organisations, there are still weaknesses at the local level that hinder the prevention of displacement, the implementation of solutions and humanitarian access.

Without a strategy to improve local capabilities in the pursuit of durable solutions, better target humanitarian assistance and strengthen the independence of international organisations as monitoring bodies, the end of the conflict, if it comes, is unlikely to mean peace or an end to protracted displacement.
Central Africa is home to some of the continent’s most complex, protracted and dynamic displacement situations. As of the end of 2014, there were at least 7.9 million IDPs in the region, spread across Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Sudan and the disputed region of Abyei. The figure represents a 15 per cent increase on 2013, five per cent of the six countries’ combined population (excluding Abyei) and 70 per cent of all displacement in Africa. In CAR and Sudan, IDPs make up as much as 10 per cent of the population and in South Sudan the figure is at least 13 per cent.

Displacement is ongoing in CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Sudan. At least 3,037,800 people were newly displaced across the four countries in 2014, representing 67 per cent of the year’s new displacement in sub-Saharan Africa and an increase of nine per cent on 2013.

Much of the new displacement took place in South Sudan, where the security situation, heavy fighting and hunger displaced more than 1.3 million people across all of the country’s 10 states. The worst-affected were Unity, Jonglei, Lakes and Upper Nile. In Sudan, as many as 457,500 people were forced to flee their homes in the Darfur region, with North and South Darfur accounting for two-thirds of the new displacement.

In DRC, events such as the Beni massacres in North Kivu displaced more than a million people in 2014, a third of whom fled during the second quarter of the year. No new displacements were reported in Burundi or Chad.

The availability and reliability of data on IDPs varies across the region. Displacement is fluid and difficult to track in CAR, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan, and data gathering is also hampered by a lack of access to affected areas, limited resources and in some cases poor coordination among those carrying out...
the task. As such, figures provide only a piecemeal picture of the true situation. Much of the new displacement in CAR in 2014 was effectively invisible under the methodologies used to collect data, while responders in Burundi and Chad have gradually disengaged and stopped gathering information since the end of the countries’ conflicts.

There is little or no data disaggregated by sex, gender and diversity or on vulnerable groups. The dispute between Sudan and South Sudan over Abyei means that the status of people displaced within and from the area is unclear, because it is impossible to establish whether or not they have crossed an international border.

CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Sudan not only have the largest displaced populations in the region, but the Fund for Peace also ranks them among the world’s top five fragile states. All six countries hosting IDPs are among the poorest in the world and rank last or near last on UNDP’s human development index for 2014. Displacement in the region has a number of causes, many of them interrelated. Civilians flee to avoid being caught up in fighting between armed groups and because they are deliberately targeted by one party to a conflict or another. In other cases, violence has been a deliberate tactic to force people off their land. Internal armed conflict and inter-communal violence often fuel one another and in some cases are interwoven to the point of being indistinguishable. Conflict in CAR and South Sudan was linked to and increasingly exploited ethnic and religious tensions in 2014.

Central Africa is home to some of the continent’s most complex, protracted and dynamic displacement situations

Disputes over the control of land and natural resources, and the pursuit of political and economic power drive much of the conflict and violence in the region. The overspill of conflicts from neighbouring countries has also fuelled displacement. Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan armed groups, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the National Liberation Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have displaced many thousands of people in DRC since the 1990s, and LRA was active in CAR in 2014, forcing hundreds of people to flee their homes.

CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Sudan not only have the largest displaced populations in the region, but the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development also ranks them among the world’s top five fragile states.

To complicate matters further, some governments in the region have historically supported armed groups in neighbouring countries. Such accusations have been a regular source of tension between Sudan and South Sudan in recent years, and to a lesser extent between Chad and both CAR and Sudan. Mercenaries from Chad and Sudan reportedly fought with the Séléka armed group that toppled the government in CAR in 2013.

Patterns of displacement

With the exception of Chad and Burundi, huge numbers of people were newly displaced in 2014, joining even larger numbers already living in protracted displacement and putting further pressure on host communities and responders. Many IDPs and returnees have been forced to flee repeatedly as violence and insecurity catches up with them. The majority of the population in DRC’s Kivu provinces have been displaced more than once.

Despite a lack of detailed information, it is clear that new conflict dynamics prompted changes in displacement patterns in 2014. CAR has been experiencing its first large-scale urban displacement crisis since the end of 2013, with as many as 512,200 IDPs living in the capital Bangui as of January 2014. In South Sudan, displacement camps barely existed before the current conflict, but have mushroomed since. Areas in and around UN military bases known as protection of civilian (PoC) sites harboured as many as 100,000 IDPs as of December 2014.

Evidence suggests that many IDPs in CAR, DRC and Sudan have undertaken pendular movements, in which they commute between their places of refuge and origin. Their decision to do so tends to be driven by a combination of economic and security factors. They go home to cultivate their land and try to meet their food needs, but do not feel safe enough to stay for extended periods. Such movements may go on for years and in some cases may even represent a resolution of IDPs’ plight in which displacement, paradoxically, is part of the solution.

The displacement of nomads such as Fulani herders in CAR was a growing issue in the region in 2014, but there is little or no information on the scope of the phenomenon or the situation and needs of those affected.

Protection issues

In addition to longstanding protection issues such as gender-based violence, land disputes and lack of civil documents, which are often linked to or aggravated by displacement, three protection concerns that arose in the region in 2014 are worth highlighting. IDPs’ right to freedom of movement was widely violated, increasing their exposure to attacks and making them less able to access food and job markets. In CAR and South Sudan, parties to the countries’ conflicts actively prevented IDPs from leaving their places of refuge, and in some cases from accessing much-needed humanitarian assistance. Some IDPs in CAR, particularly Muslims and Fulani herders and including some in neighbourhoods of Bangui, found themselves stuck in enclaves surrounded by armed militias.

In DRC’s North Kivu province, the forced closure of displacement camps pushed some IDPs to return to their places of origin even though they did not feel safe doing so or had no home to go back to. In December 2014, as many as 2,300 IDPs in Kiwanja were given only 24 hours to vacate their camp, not even giving them
time to harvest their crops.\textsuperscript{83} Their make-shift shelters were burned down, leaving them no option but to return or move on elsewhere.

Camps and spontaneous sites at which IDPs took refuge did not always provide them with the safety and security they sought. In South Sudan, several displacement and PoC sites were attacked by mobs and armed groups.\textsuperscript{84} Heavy rain and floods also made some sites in CAR and South Sudan uninhabitable, but IDPs stayed on because of their security concerns.

Heavy rain and floods also made some sites in CAR and South Sudan uninhabitable, but IDPs stayed on because of their security concerns.

The challenges IDPs in central Africa face in their daily lives are shaped by their age and sex. Displaced children, and particularly those unaccompanied, are vulnerable to child labour and recruitment and are often unable to continue their education. Changing family dynamics mean women have to assume additional responsibilities formerly reserved to men, which in some cases has led to a rise in domestic violence. Elderly IDPs who have lost or become separated from their families have more difficulty in finding food or shelter.

Durable solutions

At least 909,600 IDPs returned to their homes in central Africa in 2014. Local integration and settlement elsewhere are not tracked in the region, so no figures are available for people who pursued those settlement options. The figure for returns includes those that took place amid continuing conflict, as in DRC, Sudan and South Sudan, and post-conflict as in Burundi.

The return of nearly a million people is clearly encouraging, but their doing so cannot necessarily be equated with the achievement of durable solutions, and the figure still only represents a relatively small proportion of the region’s displaced population. Those trying to return or integrate locally have also faced many obstacles, including insecurity and limited access to land and livelihoods. Access to land for cultivation and grazing is a particularly important, given that many people’s livelihoods are based on some form of farming.

Lack of access to basic services is also an issue. Humanitarians have addressed the problem to some extent by providing IDPs, and in some cases returnees, with water, food, healthcare, sanitation and shelter. Such assistance, however, is not sustainable and does not improve beneficiaries’ self-reliance. In some cases it fosters aid dependency. As such, programmes are needed that develop IDPs’ coping mechanisms and increase their resilience.

Some if not most governments in the region favour IDPs’ return over their local integration or settlement elsewhere. The forced camp closure in North Kivu in 2014 was motivated by the provincial authorities’ wish to see its inhabitants return to their places of origin.\textsuperscript{85}

IDPs in Burundi have lived in protracted displacement since fleeing their homes during the 1993 to 2005 civil war. A pilot project on voluntary return led by the government and UNHCR and involving other local organisations led to at least 1,300 people being helped to go back to their places of origin. The process included the identification and registration of those who wished to do so, an assessment of their socioeconomic situation and the monitoring of places and conditions of return.\textsuperscript{86} Emphasis was placed on community awareness to develop social cohesion and tackle land issues.

National and international response

Central African countries face many significant challenges beyond internal displacement, but most made efforts in 2014 to address the phenomenon, whether by providing assistance, coordinating its delivery or developing national legal frameworks. Despite such efforts, limited resources and capacity, and in some cases a lack of political will, meant they struggled to assist and protect IDPs effectively.

CAR, DRC and Sudan made progress in developing and revising national frameworks relevant to IDPs. The government of DRC continued to work towards ratifying the Kampala Convention, but was still to submit the necessary paperwork to the AU as of the end of 2014. In line with its obligations under the Great Lakes Pact and protocols, it has also drafted a law that covers IDPs’ protection and assistance during all phases of displacement. Whether such frameworks will have any impact on IDPs’ lives will depend on their successful implementation, but parliament is still to adopt the legislation.

The government of Chad, meantime, assumes that displacement in the country has come to an end. It has stopped recognising those who have not returned or integrated locally as IDPs and no longer provides them with direct assistance.\textsuperscript{87}

Given the immense needs of both IDPs and their host communities, the international humanitarian and development responses have been chronically underfunded in all six countries.

The international response is in many cases a de facto substitute for governments’ role in assisting and protecting IDPs, particularly when it comes to humanitarian aid. Countries such as Chad and Burundi, however, which no longer have active conflicts, have seen humanitarian engagement decline without the development sector becoming more involved in its place. Longer-term commitments, efforts and investment are needed, including in situations of continuing conflict, if the international community is to help prevent countries from relapsing into crisis as happened in South Sudan in 2014.

International aid workers face significant challenges to their work in central Africa, not least because local capacities tend to be poor and qualified international staff difficult to attract, compared with other regions. Insecurity and restrictions
imposed by the government and NSAGs have also restricted access in countries such as South Sudan and Sudan, and elsewhere humanitarians have come under repeated attack and intimidation. According to OCHA, 72 per cent of the 890 security incidents registered in CAR between January and July 2014 targeted humanitarian personnel and their assets.

There are concerns that humanitarian space is at risk in CAR, DRC and South Sudan. Increasingly blurred lines between the activities of humanitarians and UN and AU peacekeepers make it more difficult to maintain the perception of neutrality in the eyes of both civilians and parties to the conflicts. In DRC, Sudan and South Sudan, IDPs have sought refuge in or around UN bases, leading peacekeepers to focus on protecting civilians in their immediate vicinity rather than addressing the source of the protection threat.

Given the immense needs of both IDPs and their host communities, the international humanitarian and development responses have been chronically under-funded in all six countries. In DRC and Sudan donor fatigue may be a significant factor. By the end of 2014, organisations operating in DRC had received only 45.6 per cent of the funds requested under the humanitarian action plan for the country. 2015 will be a year of change and hope in central Africa, with Burundi, CAR, Chad and Sudan all holding national elections.

The polls could be an opportunity for governments to commit to helping their displaced populations and to increase their efforts to do so, but they also carry a risk of renewing old tensions and fuelling violence and new displacements.

IDP VOICES
DRC

"Itunda"
Kitshanga, North Kivu
November 2014

I was born in 1957 in Muhanga in North Kivu in eastern DRC. I have 16 children with my two wives. The first time we were displaced was in 1993, following fighting between the armed groups MAGRIVI and Bushenge Hunde. It was a hard time for us because we were hiding in the bush.

In 2007, we were displaced from our village again because of attacks by the CNDP armed group. This time we lived in a displacement camp in Goma. We survived there thanks to my work in a sand quarry, and my wives and children collected wood in the bush to sell.

After a while we decided to go back to Muhanga, but we found that CNDP had burned our house down. I also received threats from people who accused me of being an accomplice of an armed self-defence group, so we decided to move to Kitshanga in North Kivu, where we felt that we would have more security.

In 2011 we went back to Muhanga again, but were forced to flee in 2013 because the national army was after yet another armed group. We decided to return to Kitshanga, where we are currently living. I commute between Kitshanga and Muhanga so I can continue to farm.

My only hope for our situation is that the state helps us to return, or that it gives us work to be able to earn enough money to meet our main needs.

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Democracy
Republic of
the Congo

Multiple
displacement
and community
resilience

Weak governance, poverty, chronic underdevelopment and pervasive corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have coalesced with armed conflict and violence to perpetuate displacement for years, sometimes even decades. As of the end of 2014, there were at least 2.7 million IDPs in the country, mainly in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Orientale and Katanga. At least 1,003,400 people were newly displaced during the year, and 561,100 IDPs returned to their places of origin. Many others have been living in displacement for years.

Data is limited in many provinces, but there is broad recognition that protracted displacement is the fate of the majority of the country’s IDPs. Almost 80 per cent of all IDPs live with local communities or host families, while others have set up spontaneous settlements, live in the bush or take refuge in official camps managed with the support of humanitarian organisations.

IDPs in North and South Kivu suffer the consequences of both protracted and multiple displacement. Decades of conflict, attacks by armed groups, inter-communal violence and human rights violations have forced many to flee their homes and places of refuge time and again. They move between and within urban and rural areas as both a protection and resilience strategy, the length of their stay in each place varying from one situation to another.

Our research on protracted and multiple displacement in Masisi territory in North Kivu and Uvira territory in South Kivu, shows that the vast majority of IDPs have been displaced more than once in their life. Some are displaced again after returning to their home areas, forced to flee their places of refuge by the threat or impact of renewed conflict. The effects of persistent violence and repeated flight are severe, both for IDPs and their hosts. Every time people are displaced, they lose more of their assets and have to start again from scratch, eroding their ability to cope and increasing their poverty, needs and vulnerability. The longer displacement goes on, the tougher the
conditions IDPs and their host communities have to endure. Hosts’ capacity to help and support IDPs diminishes over time and with every new wave of displacement, as does access to jobs, livelihoods, land, education and health services.

Our research also shows that multiple displacement take its toll on relationships both within and between families and communities. The more often people are displaced, the more likely their communities and families are to break up, which makes it ever more difficult to maintain or establish support networks.

People who experience multiple displacement find different ways to adapt and often resort to a combination of coping mechanisms. Short-term pendular movement, whereby IDPs shuttle between their place of origin and refuge, is often the initial strategy, helping displaced households to meet their needs and secure their land. As conflict and insecurity continue, however, and people are forced to flee again, they often abandon their fields and agricultural activities.

The provision of aid in North and South Kivu currently focuses on emergency assistance, including water, sanitation, health and shelter, which in some cases can undermine IDPs’ coping strategies and increase the risk of aid dependency. The distinction that humanitarians often draw between IDPs and their host communities in their planning and programming can cause tensions and prevent IDPs’ social inclusion.55

Some humanitarian practitioners are trying to shift towards initiatives that support IDPs’ coping mechanisms and build their resilience. The government made progress towards concluding the process to ratify the Kampala Convention in July 2014. In order to incorporate the convention into national legal and policy frameworks, a law on IDPs’ protection and assistance is about to be adopted. Such instruments are important and necessary, but what matters most if they are to have a positive impact on IDPs’ lives is successful implementation, particularly in the long term.
Figures and causes of displacement

As of December 2014, there were up to 1.9 million IDPs in east Africa, spread across Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The overall figure represents little change from 2013. Somalia continues to host by far the largest displaced population in the region with 1.1 million IDPs, followed by Ethiopia with 397,200 and Kenya with 309,200.

At least 446,250 people were newly displaced across the region during the year. As in 2013, new displacements only took place in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, which continue to be affected by violence and conflict. No new displacement was reported in Eritrea, Uganda or Zimbabwe. The overall figure is an increase of more than 132,400 on 2013, a significant spike in Kenya outstripping a decrease in Ethiopia.

More than 220,000 people fled their homes in Kenya in 2014, mainly as a result of inter-communal violence. The northern pastoralist areas of the country were particularly affected. Many of the new IDPs reportedly returned, but others remained in displacement, either living with host communities or in camps. Inter-communal violence was also the main driver of new displacement in Ethiopia, where 137,100 people fled their homes as a result of clashes between different clans. The majority were living in the country’s Somali region.

Somalia has the longest-running displacement situation in east Africa, and at least 89,000 people were newly displaced during 2014, representing a slight increase on 2013. Most fled an offensive launched by the Somali military and the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab, which has taken control of large parts of the country. Around 73,000 people fled their homes during the first phase of the op-
Inter-communal violence was also a major destabilising factor during the year. Clashes between clans took place in several parts of the country, leading to the displacement of at least 9,000 people.

Displacement figures in east Africa and Zimbabwe come with many caveats. The figure of 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia, for example, is a static estimate in a context that often changes rapidly, and in a society whose populations are traditionally highly mobile. The data behind the estimate comes from humanitarians’ project-based assessments and registration activities, meaning it was collected for limited purposes and geographical coverage and using different methodologies. Many only assign people status as IDPs based on their presence at displacement sites, meaning there is little or no information on those living in more dispersed settings. Access to some parts of the country is difficult, as is distinguishing between voluntary and forced movements.

Stakeholders acknowledge that the figure is outdated and in need of revision, and in 2014 JIPS supported profiling exercises in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Once findings are available, they will be used to inform a comprehensive durable solutions strategy and may affect the overall estimate of the number of IDPs in the country.

More than 220,000 people fled their homes in Kenya in 2014, compared with 55,000 in 2013, mainly as a result of inter-communal violence.

Kenya also lacks comprehensive and up-to-date data on displacement. The most recent informed estimate of 309,200 IDPs, provided by OCHA in December 2014, refers mostly to people displaced by political violence related to elections between 1992 and 2008. Over the years, many have integrated locally, settled elsewhere in the country or returned to their places of origin, but there has been no official assessment of their number or their outstanding protection needs. OCHA’s figure does not include displaced pastoralists or those who took refuge from political violence outside camps and sites. Nor does it include those newly displaced since 2008.

Eritrea, Uganda and Zimbabwe have relatively small numbers of IDPs living in protracted displacement. In the absence of updated information, figures for the three countries are unchanged from 2013. In Somalia, the only figures available are estimates based on past needs assessments. OCHA reported in 2009 that there were 36,000 IDPs as a result of violence associated with the 2008 elections, but anecdotal sources put the number much higher. Most are thought to have been able to return home. OCHA’s figure does not include people displaced by causes other than conflict and violence, among them government policies and actions that have caused displacement since 2000.

Many forms of violence forced people to flee their homes in east Africa in 2014, including armed conflict and struggles for political power. Two other drivers, inter-communal violence and the activities of extremist groups, were also prevalent across various countries and often affected the same areas.

The inter-communal violence comes as no surprise, given there are at least 160 different ethnic groups in the region. Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda are also home to one of the world’s largest populations of pastoralists, who live in areas where other livelihoods are barely viable. Violence is often triggered by competition over increasingly scarce resources such as land and water, cattle rustling, revenge attacks, border disputes and struggles for political representation. The displacement of pastoralists, which is intrinsically linked to their inability to access land and resources and their loss of livestock and markets, is particularly relevant to this region.

Violence associated with political and religious extremists is not new, but displacement caused by it, or the threat of it, appears to be increasing. Kenya has been subjected to a growing number of attacks, including the 2013 assault on Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in which at least 67 people were killed and 175 injured. Several attacks on civilians caused displacement in 2014, including in Mandera and Lamu counties. According to diplomats and security analysts, Islamists operating in Kenya’s Coast region are thought to have tapped into local grievances about issues such as tenure insecurity, poverty and unemployment.

Ethiopia also faces the threat of extremist attacks, in large part because Ethiopian troops fight alongside forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda as part of AMISOM’s efforts to counter Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Continuing armed struggles for self-determination in the Somali and Oromia regions of the country also have the potential to cause future displacement.

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Al-Shabaab has suffered military and territorial losses, but it remains the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. It has managed to maintain a violent foothold in Mogadishu and has demonstrated its operational reach beyond the capital by carrying out fatal assaults in southern and central Somalia, and inspiring coordinated attacks against the country’s neighbours.

Somalia’s government confronted many challenges in 2014 as it sought to consolidate the country’s federal structure in the face of continuing pressures for regional autonomy. Attacks on civilians that caused displacement were also reported in the north-eastern region of Sool, which is particularly prone to conflict given competing claims by Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo to oil-rich territory. Khatumo is a political organisation pursuing the creation of a regional state separate from Somaliland.
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Shabaab has consistently denied humanitarian access to people in areas under its control and restricted the movement of people and goods into government-held areas, putting civilian lives at risk. Some parties to the conflict - al-Shabaab, AMISOM, the Somali armed forces and others – are said to be perpetrators. Forced evictions in Mogadishu also made the dire protection and humanitarian situation of thousands of IDPs worse. Newly displaced IDPs in areas of Ethiopia and Kenya affected by conflict reportedly had unmet protection needs.

Food insecurity is a serious concern across east Africa, and particularly for IDPs. The Somali government declared drought in seven regions of the country in 2014, and the lack of rainfall and lower agricultural yields combined with rising food prices, the impact of conflict and a shortage of funding make the situation in the country particularly concerning. Al-Shabaab has consistently denied humanitarian access to people in areas under its control and restricted the movement of people and goods into government-held areas, putting civilian lives at risk. Some surveys suggest that Somali IDPs have the highest rates of severe acute malnutrition in the country, and that the death rate among displaced children under five in Mogadishu is six times the average.

In Kenya, localised clashes such as those in Marsabit and Turkana counties disrupted markets and with it access to supplies, heightening food insecurity for both IDPs and the general population. Overcrowding and unhygienic conditions were widespread in many of Kenya’s and Somalia’s displacement camps, increasing the risk of outbreaks and the spread of diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and malaria.

The majority of the region’s IDPs struggle to access basic services, including healthcare and education. Poverty and the fact that facilities are few and far between are significant impediments. Even when governments offer free primary education, as in Kenya, Somaliland and Uganda, hidden costs such as materials and transport, and the need for children to contribute to their household’s income prevent many from attending school. Prolonged conflict and protracted displacement make school enrolment rates in Somalia among the world’s lowest. Displaced children, particularly girls, are less likely to attend school than other Somalis.

### Protection issues

IDPs’ living conditions varied widely across the region in 2014, depending on the cause and length of their displacement. Their needs ranged from emergency humanitarian assistance to interventions aimed at the achievement of durable solutions.

Increasing insecurity and new cycles of conflict led to the targeting of civilians, sexual and other gender-based violence and the forced recruitment and abuse of children, particularly in southern and central Somalia. IDPs were particularly vulnerable to such violations. All parties to the conflict - al-Shabaab, AMISOM, the Somali armed forces and others – are said to be perpetrators. Forced evictions in Mogadishu also made the dire protection and humanitarian situation of thousands of IDPs worse. Newly displaced IDPs in areas of Ethiopia and Kenya affected by conflict reportedly had unmet protection needs.

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### Food insecurity

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### Durable solutions

Concerted humanitarian, development and peace-building efforts are required across the region if IDPs are to achieve durable solutions to their displacement. A shortage of livelihood opportunities is one of the most significant obstacles they face.

In the Acholi region of northern Uganda, where the vast majority of IDPs returned and farming is the main potential source of income, most were only able to produce enough to subsist on. In Kenya, most displaced farmers were forced to leave all their belongings behind when they fled, preventing them from practicing their traditional livelihoods either during their displacement or when they returned or resettled. Livelihood opportunities across the region are closely linked to access to land, a fact particularly true for displaced pastoralists, who require special attention if they are to achieve durable solutions.

In Zimbabwe, poor tenure security and lack of access to civil registration and documentation are major obstacles for a significant number of IDPs, both to their achievement of durable solutions and access to essential services. In Uganda and Kenya the legal system governing land is complex, and Somalia has no written land law or policy at all. Such factors, combined with the high number of disputes resulting from large-scale displacement and return, hamper the determination of tenure rights and compensation.

### National and international response

Some progress was made in responding to displacement from a legal and policy perspective in 2014. In October, Somalia’s federal government adopted a policy framework on displacement, and in December it established an agency for refugees and IDPs responsible for its implementation. Puntland adopted policy guidelines on IDPs in 2012, and Somaliland developed a draft policy framework in 2014, but it was still to be adopted as of the end of the year.
The efficacy of such initiatives will hinge on their implementation, which requires a functional government focal point to lead and oversee the process, coordinate among stakeholders and ensure the necessary human and financial resources. Without such efforts, the best intentions on paper will not translate in effective action on the ground.

Kenya developed a comprehensive draft policy and adopted an Act on IDPs in 2012, but as of the end of 2014 it had made little progress either in moving the policy beyond the draft stage or in implementing the Act. In Zimbabwe, findings from an earlier rapid assessment to determine the scope of displacement were not released in 2014, and plans for an update and a nationwide quantitative survey have not moved forward.

There were no new ratifications of the Kampala Convention in east Africa in 2014. Somalia ratified it internally in 2013, but has not yet registered the fact with the AU. Zimbabwe is still to incorporate its provisions into domestic law, but in December 2014 representatives of ministries, humanitarian agencies, civil society organisations and displaced communities took part in a workshop to identify steps towards doing so.

From an operational perspective, responses differed from country to country, but they share some common threads. IDPs living outside camps, who often constitute the vast majority, are largely invisible throughout the region, meaning they tend not to be included in data collection exercises and in turn may be excluded from protection and assistance. This is a significant issue in Somalia and Kenya, and has been in Uganda as well.

Insecurity, poor infrastructure and vast distances to cover continue to make humanitarian access difficult in areas affected by conflict and violence in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Larger parts of Somalia opened up in 2014, but the quality and sustainability of access got worse in many places as result of deteriorating security and intensified conflict. The government resumed control of some urban areas as a result of its offensive against al-Shabaab, but access and supply lines are still highly vulnerable to attack. Towns the rebels have laid siege to are only accessible by air, and providing assistance in many rural areas remains extremely difficult.

Humanitarian funding for Somalia was critically low throughout the year. The UN’s humanitarian coordinator for the country blamed competing global crises, growing needs but static funding levels and a shift from a humanitarian to a political agenda among donors.

In Kenya, assistance and donor attention continued to decline despite ongoing displacement. Several civil society organisations that have played a major role in protecting and assisting IDPs for many years have been left with very limited funding to continue their work. The Kenya Red Cross Society is usually the first responder to a crisis, but the deteriorating security situation and burgeoning number of IDPs in the north of the country put significant strain on its resources and demanded concerted efforts from all stakeholders.

Humanitarian issues should be incorporated into development, peace-building and state-building efforts.

In Ethiopia, the government and its humanitarian partners work jointly to provide emergency assistance to people affected by conflict and disasters, including IDPs. There continues to be a significant need for development and peace-building partners to become involved in addressing displacement in east Africa. As it has done in the past, the Kenyan government’s response to violence in 2014 focussed on enforcing security, to the detriment of other areas such as peace-building and social cohesion programmes.

In Somalia, long-term efforts to shore up and stabilise the state are critical to IDPs’ being able to achieve durable solutions. As such, displacement issues should be incorporated into development, peace-building and state-building efforts. The implementation of the New Deal compact constitutes an opportunity to do so, and in 2014 the international community pushed for IDPs’ durable solutions to be included in its provisions. Sustained advocacy will be needed to make it happen.
Political, ethnic and land-related violence, disasters and development projects have all repeatedly triggered displacement in Kenya since independence. The worst violence took place in the aftermath of the disputed December 2007 presidential election, and forced nearly 664,000 people to flee their homes. Inter-communal violence attributed to competition over resources such as land and water, cattle rustling and struggles for political representation also continue to cause displacement. According to OCHA, more than 220,000 people were newly displaced in 2014 alone.

Some episodes of displacement have been short lived, but many have become protracted, the result of a combination of factors. Some national authorities only recognise those who were registered as displaced by the 2007 to 2008 post-election violence as IDPs. The registration process also excluded so-called “integrated” IDPs, an estimated 300,000 people who found shelter with host communities or in rented accommodation in urban areas. Given that assistance was limited to those registered, “integrated” IDPs were always less likely to achieve durable solutions to their displacement.

People forcibly evicted, those displaced by disasters, displaced pastoralists, and those who have fled violence other than that associated with the December 2007 election are not considered IDPs at all, and tend to be unable to achieve durable solutions on their own for years. Even many of those registered are still struggling to do so, despite government efforts to resettle or assist them.

The ICC’s investigations into responsibility for the 2007 to 2008 post-election violence increased political interest in showing that displacement had been fully addressed. As highlighted by the special rapporteur on IDPs’ human rights, however, “the end of displacement cannot be determined by a political decision, but by reality, and solutions must be pursued more rigorously for all IDPs in an equal manner.”

The lack of official, comprehensive and up-to-date data on IDPs also helps to perpetuate displacement. Data gathering has focused on new displacements caused by violence and rapid-onset disasters, and there is little quantitative or qualitative information on IDPs’ movements beyond their initial flight.

The most recent informed estimate, provided by OCHA in December 2014, put
the number of IDPs at 309,200, but the figure accounts mainly for people displaced by election-related violence between 1992 and 2008. It does not include those displaced by disasters and development projects, or displaced pastoralists. Nor does it include those more recently displaced by violence, though some remain in displacement, particularly in the Coast region and the northern pastoralist areas. Humanitarian assessments suggest that at least 60,000 of those displaced in Mandera county in 2014 were still living in camps or with host communities as of the end of the year.

Over the years, many others have integrated locally, settled elsewhere in the country or returned to their places of origin, but there has been no official assessment of their number or their outstanding protection needs.

The achievement of durable solutions for Kenya’s IDPs depends on ensuring access to services and livelihood opportunities, and dealing with complex issues of land tenure. Forced evictions and violence are closely linked to tenure insecurity, arising from competing land claims and incompatibility between formal and informal tenure systems. Disasters increase competition for limited resources, including land, and contribute to violence between herders and farmers, and among different pastoralist groups, leading to displacement.

Many IDPs live in marginalised areas that are environmentally and economically vulnerable, with poor infrastructure and extremely limited access to basic services such as water, healthcare, education and markets. In Mandera county almost 3,800 women in every 100,000 die during childbirth each year, compared with the national average of 360, and 860 in Somalia.

The government’s response to protracted IDPs’ protection needs and support for their pursuit of durable solutions could be improved by the application of the existing national legal and policy framework on displacement, which Kenya has made progress towards putting into place. The cabinet endorsed a draft national policy in October 2012 and parliament adopted an Act on IDPs in December of the same year. Since then, however, there has been little progress towards implementing the Act or moving the national policy beyond the draft stage. Kenya is also still to sign and ratify the Kampala Convention.
Figures of displacement

As of the end of 2014, there were at least 1.5 million IDPs across eight West African countries: Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. Nigeria had the largest number with at least a million, followed by Côte d’Ivoire with just over 300,000 and Mali with at least 61,000. We reported displacement in Cameroon for the first time, after cross-border attacks by the Islamist militant group Boko Haram forced at least 40,000 people to flee their homes.106

Improvements in data collection led us to increase our cumulative estimate for Côte d’Ivoire four-fold and reduce our figure for Nigeria by 70 per cent. The later is likely to be an underestimate, given that the assessments were not conducted country-wide nor did they cover situations of protracted displacement, but at year end it was the most reliable figure available (see page 85). In the absence of new data, our estimates for Liberia, Niger, Senegal and Togo remain unchanged.

Nigeria was worst affected by new displacement in 2014. Increasingly brutal attacks by Boko Haram intensified dramatically in the second half of the year, causing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the north-east that spilled over into neighbouring countries. Its attacks and abductions, heavy-handed counter-insurgency operations against it and inter-communal violence displaced at least 975,300 people.107 Data gathered in the north-eastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe revealed nearly 75,000 people displaced by inter-communal violence during the year.108

The majority of assistance targeted IDPs taking refuge in camps and camp-like settings, but 92.4 per cent were living with host families.109 Boko Haram’s attacks and abductions also drove at least 150,000 people across the border into Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has abducted at least 500 people in north-eastern Nigeria since 2009110 and such abuses escalated exponentially in
2014, IDPs cited fear of abduction as a key factor in their decision to flee.112

In Côte d’Ivoire, a pervasive climate of fear and inter-communal mistrust pervaded in the west of the country, where recurrent clashes and cross-border attacks by armed groups along the Liberian border continued to force thousands of people to flee their homes. We estimate that such clashes have displaced at least 33,800 people since 2012, including more than 5,500 people who fled from Fetai and surrounding villages in 2014.113 Tensions also simmered in northern Mali, where militants’ increasingly frequent attacks forced at least 19,000 people to uproot their families and seek safety elsewhere.114

Causes of displacement

Displacement across the region as a whole was caused by extremist violence, political power struggles, disputes over natural resources and inter-communal conflict often linked to land tenure. Conflicts have shifted from one country to another over the last two decades, and Boko Haram’s insurgency took on a more regional dimension in 2014. A common pattern also emerged in which the marginalisation and underdevelopment of certain areas fuels north-south divisions and leads to surges in violence that force large numbers of people to flee within and across borders.

Conflicts have shifted from one country to another over the last two decades, and Boko Haram’s insurgency took on a more regional dimension in 2014

Poverty, increasing inequality and social frustration in northern Nigeria form the backdrop to Boko Haram’s expansion, as it carries out unrelenting attacks on civilians in its campaign to establish an independent Islamic state. Communal tensions along ethnic and religious fault-lines have also sparked violence throughout the underdeveloped north and Middle Belt, the dividing line between Nigeria’s Muslim north and wealthier Christian south.

Mali continued its slow recovery from the crisis triggered in 2012 by Islamist armed groups’ occupation of the north, a region historically neglected. By the end of 2014, a third round of unsuccessful peace negotiations had concluded and armed groups continued to seek self-rule from the south to overcome economic and political marginalisation.115

Recent clashes in Côte d’Ivoire have long-standing roots in west Africa’s “regional conflict” in the 1990s. Charles Taylor’s armed rebellion in northern Liberia plunged the region into progressive destabilisation that displaced more than three million people over the following decades, most of them internally.116 Taylor also had a direct role in setting up armed groups that led a coup in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002,117 which effectively split the country in half and kindled a north-south divide for the following decade.

Data collection

Information on the extent to which IDPs have achieved durable solutions is all but absent in west Africa

In Nigeria, IOM set up its displacement tracking matrix to support the government in collecting and disseminating data on IDPs. Teams composed of members of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the state emergency management agencies and the Nigerian Red Cross Society identified 997,300 IDPs in the north-eastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe as of the end of 2014.118 The majority of people covered by the exercise cited Boko Haram’s insurgency as the reason for their flight, while a smaller number said they had fled inter-communal clashes. NEMA also collected data on IDPs in Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa and Plateau, and an assessment by the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) revealed IDPs living in Benue and Ebonyi states. We combined information from all three sources to arrive at our estimate for the country of at least 1,075,300 IDPs.

The establishment of IOM’s displacement tracking matrix and the estimates from NEMA and NCFR provided some clarity about the volatile and rapidly evolving situation in the north-east. Access restrictions still prevented reliable data being collected for some areas, notably in Borno state where only three out of 27 local government areas were accessible. There are also undoubtedly many people living in protracted displacement in other parts of the country who were not captured by the assessments. Data collected on people fleeing inter-communal violence in the Middle Belt was inconsistent and incomplete,119 and there was no official and impartial forum dedicated to sharing and analysing data for the country as a whole. The lack of a holistic understanding of displacement dynamics in Nigeria resulted in a fragmented and inadequate humanitarian and development response to those in need.

Protection issues

IDPs caught up in the region’s unfolding emergencies and conflicts faced many protection threats in 2014. Thousands of people in Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in particular were exposed to risks to their physical security including armed attacks and clashes, forced recruitment, arbitrary killings, sexual violence and abductions.

IDPs in north-eastern Nigeria also had their freedom of movement restricted, in some cases severely. Boko Haram’s proclamation of a caliphate in parts of

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Adamawa and Borno trapped people in those areas, with reports of those trying to flee being summarily executed. As the insurgents fought the security forces for the control of main roads, civilians were often forced to flee to the surrounding forests, where many lost their way and some died of hunger and thirst. The fact that IDPs often have to pay to pass through Boko Haram checkpoints also steered people towards the forests, and away from areas where they may have been more likely to receive assistance.

Those who did go back to their homes often found themselves at risk of being displaced again, or without the basic services needed to support their reintegration.

Gender-based violence has been a feature of Boko Haram’s attacks, and its members have systematically abused the women and girls it has abducted. As the number of IDPs living in camps in the north-east increased during 2014, there were reports of rape and the trafficking of hundreds of girls, particularly those unregistered. There were also reports of “discipline committees” meting out corporal punishment to displaced women. Children make up a disproportionate 58 per cent of IDPs living in camps in the north-east.

Many IDPs continued to face protection risks even once they had returned to their places of origin, preventing them from achieving durable solutions. In Côte d’Ivoire, returns were marred by land disputes, some of which led to violence. Government-sanctioned evictions from protected forests in the west and south-west of the country continued to be a threat to thousands of people. In Mali, people going back to their homes in the north often found their return to be unsustainable as a result of insecurity that continues to strain the country’s social fabric. Many who would have returned to rural areas have instead made their way to urban centres thought to be safer.

Displaced children, who account for more than half of west Africa’s IDPs, are particularly exposed to violence, abuse and exploitation. There is a tradition in the region of confiage, sending children from rural areas to live and work in the urban households of extended family members, but separations prompted by displacement have left many to cope on their own.

In Nigeria, vulnerable IDPs in Adamawa state, including children, are thought to have resorted to survival sex to meet their basic needs. Young men and boys, particularly those who are separated or unaccompanied, risk forced recruitment into Boko Haram’s ranks in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger. Self-defence groups in north-eastern Nigeria, including the Civilian Joint Task Force formed to protect the capital of Borno state, are also reported to use child fighters.

The degree of brutality in Mali and Nigeria has left many people with symptoms of extreme stress and psychological trauma that have gone unaddressed and untreated. Many children are terrified of loud noises that remind them of the violence they witnessed.

Access to education continued to be a major challenge in northern Mali. More than 80 per cent of teaching staff in Timbuktu region were displaced during the 2012 crisis, and schools in Kidal region relied on volunteers because no state teachers had resumed their posts. Given that many IDPs shelter in school buildings, and humanitarian assistance tends to be limited to life-saving interventions, displaced children are generally unable to pursue their education.

Many IDPs in Nigeria’s north-east and Middle Belt, northern Mali and western Côte d’Ivoire have been displaced more than once, but information on their situation is scarce. Repeated displacement increases households’ needs and reduces their coping strategies, but those affected have not received commensurate assistance, leaving many unable to recover from their plight.

Durable solutions

Ten west African countries have ratified the Kampala Convention, but displacement in the region still tends to be addressed as a short-term and humanitarian issue, with minimal resources dedicated to helping IDPs return, integrate locally or settle elsewhere in the country. The lack of focus on durable solutions and the absence in many cases of country-wide monitoring means little information is available about IDPs living in protracted displacement. There is evidence, however, to suggest that they face significant obstacles in exercising their human rights, particularly in terms of physical security, property and livelihoods.

Continuing insecurity in northern Nigeria, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire prevents many IDPs from returning safely and sustainably. Those who did go back to their homes often found themselves at risk of being displaced again, or without the basic services needed to support their reintegration.

Access to land, restitution and tenure security are among the many challenges IDPs face in making their returns sustainable. Returning IDPs and refugees in western Côte d’Ivoire often find their land, plantations and homes have been illegally occupied or sold in their absence. Others in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Nigeria wish to return, but are unable to afford the cost of rebuilding their damaged or destroyed property.

As of the end of the year, seven of the west African countries we monitor had IDPs living in protracted displacement. In Côte d’Ivoire, having coped with life in displacement for more than ten years in some cases, 90 per cent of IDPs no longer wanted to return to their homes. Information on IDPs displaced from past conflicts in Liberia, Niger and Senegal was not available.

National and international response

Côte d’Ivoire and Mali made a number of promising commitments in 2014 that signalled hope for an improved response to displacement. Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Kampala Convention, and as a pilot country for the implementation of the
UN framework on ending displacement in the aftermath of conflict it developed a durable solutions strategy informed by a profiling exercise. Mali also developed a durable solutions strategy that was still to be approved as of the end of the year.

There was little if any progress on developing national legal and policy frameworks for IDPs’ assistance and protection. Nigeria’s national policy on displacement remained stalled for a second year, hampering the coordination of humanitarian and development efforts and ultimately failing those in need. Liberia’s draft bill endorsing the Kampala Convention was shelved by the lower chamber of parliament.

Despite significant insecurity, national and international humanitarian organisations continued to assist the most vulnerable people in areas of northern Mali, most notably in Kidal. Access restrictions made it more difficult, however, to reach those in need in north-eastern Nigeria. Policy in Côte d’Ivoire shifted to recovery and development in 2014, with the inherent risk of diverting already limited funds away from interventions to address the needs of those still living in displacement.

The unprecedented crisis in north-eastern Nigeria and the ensuing large-scale displacement have created enormous operational challenges for the government, whose efforts to respond have been fragmented and uncoordinated.

Response plan for Nigeria was only 13 per cent funded as of the end of the year – undermined an already weak response in hard-to-reach areas still further. As such, host communities have been left to provide the majority of assistance to people displaced by Boko Haram and inter-communal violence receive.

Côte d’Ivoire’s Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation delivered its final report in December 2014 after three years of deliberation. Doubts remain, however, about its impartiality and the logistics of the compensation process. The effective processing of all victims’ claims will be crucial in rebuilding trust, particularly during the investigative phase, which has yet to start. It is also unclear how the various institutions set up to address similar issues will function together, given their overlapping mandates that depend on different ministries.

There were also questions about the inclusiveness of Mali’s peace process. Civil society, including IDPs and others affected by the crisis, were only allowed to take an active part in the second of many rounds of negotiations, leaving concerns at the community level in danger of being overlooked.
The number of IDPs in the Middle East and north Africa rose to a new record for the third consecutive year, reaching at least 11.9 million by the end of 2014. The figure, which aggregates estimates for Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria and Yemen, represents nearly a third of all the people displaced by conflict worldwide. From 2001 until 2011, displacement in the region accounted for a mere seven to 14 per cent of the global figure, the increase caused by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent sectarian war. Iraq aside, the region as a whole was relatively stable until 2011, with displacement driven primarily by low-intensity and nationally contained conflicts involving sporadic large-scale military operations.

The 2011 uprisings coined the “Arab spring”, however, ushered in a period of chronic political instability and civil war, with conflict and its repercussions spilling over national borders and convulsing the region. In the last four years, more than 7.8 million people have fled their homes, joining 4.1 million people already living in protracted displacement.

There were at least 7.6 million IDPs in Syria as of the end of 2014, the highest number in the region and almost an 18-fold increase over the last four years. The number of IDPs in Iraq has almost nearly doubled over the same period to at least 3.3 million. The two countries accounted for 91 per cent of the displacement recorded in the region, but the number of IDPs also increased in other countries. At least 400,000 people had fled their homes in Libya, more than a 6-fold increase on 2013, and the number of IDPs in occupied Palestine reached at least 275,000. In Yemen, returns ebbed and...
around 100,000 people were displaced by renewed conflict, bringing the total figure for the country to 334,100.

The sharp increase in the number of IDPs in Iraq and Syria reflects not only the failure of national authorities to prevent displacement and protect those fleeing, but also the role they have played in exploiting and instigating conflict for political or economic gain. As noted by the UN special rapporteur on IDPs, displacement has been used as a strategy of war, with the Syrian armed forces directly targeting civilians and forcing them to flee. NSAGs have resorted to the same strategy.

In occupied Palestine, discriminatory Israeli policies and practices have caused the displacement of Palestinians. The Islamic State (ISIL)'s territorial expansion from Syria into Iraq, and the Iraqi authorities' response, have also forced civilians to flee their homes. Displacement in Yemen and Libya has been made worse by renewed insurgencies that have caused significant political instability.

Monitoring IDPs in urban areas, where most are located, is a particular challenge, made more difficult by the intensity and unpredictable dynamics of the fighting, which has also led to people being displaced more than once.

In the last four years, more than 7.8 million people have fled their homes, joining 4.1 million people already living in protracted displacement.

OCHA leads data gathering in Syria in consultation with other UN partners, NGOs and the national authorities. Its efforts, however, have been hampered by insecurity, access restrictions imposed by the authorities and NSAGs. In addition, both have been reluctant to share information on displacement. In July 2014, the UN estimated that 4.7 million people – IDPs and local residents – were trapped in hard-to-reach areas of the country.

In Iraq, IOM and UNHCR rely on their local staff and the national authorities for information, but areas under ISIL's control have been extremely hard to reach. The group controls almost all of Anbar, Ninewa and Salah-el-Din governorates. Data on displacement in Libya has become much sketchier since July, when most international humanitarian and development organisations, UN agencies and ICRC moved their operations to Tunisia following the outbreak of renewed fighting. In Yemen too, the resumption of conflict and the access restrictions it caused were significant challenges to data collection. Complex displacement patterns and the fact the many people have been forced to flee more than once made the task more complicated still.

New displacement and displacement patterns

Across the region, 3.8 million people, or around 10,500 a day, were newly displaced in 2014. Iraq, Libya and Syria accounted for much of total, but Israel's military incursion into the Gaza Strip in July and August also displaced as many as 500,000 Palestinians, at least 117,000 of whom were still displaced at the end of the year. Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip effectively trapped IDPs in the conflict area, meaning that the safety they were able to seek when they fled their homes was distinctly relative. By comparison, displacement inside Israel occurred on an extremely limited scale.

IDPs were also trapped in conflict areas as in Syria, where civilians were displaced a number of times as front lines shifted, both in fighting between government forces and armed opposition groups, and among the rebels themselves.

In Iraq, almost all those newly displaced came from areas that fell under ISIL's control. The Kurdish region received almost half of the new IDPs, while 38 per cent remained within their own government. ISIL fighters specifically targeted certain religious and ethnic communities, including Christians, Shia Muslims, Druze, Yazidis, Kurds and Turkomen, who fled to escape massacres, abductions, the destruction of property, forced marriages and the sexual enslavement of women.

In Libya and Yemen conflict engulfed the most populated areas of both countries.

A region where camps are associated with the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations, governments have generally been reluctant to establish them. The majority of IDPs live with host families or in informal settlements in urban areas. Only two per cent of IDPs in Syria live in camps in areas beyond government control along the Turkish and Jordanian border. In Iraq the figure is nine per cent. As many as 96 per cent of Yemen's IDPs are thought to live in urban settings, avoiding camps for cultural reasons and their perception of them as promiscuous environments.

Protection issues

Displacement in the region has increased mainly as a result of gross and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law perpetrated by various states and NSAGs over decades. The asymmetrical nature of the region's conflicts, in which conventional armies such as those of Israel, Syria and Iraq are pitted against NSAGs, and the fact that fighting often takes place in urban areas, mean that civilians have been disproportionately affected.

Monitoring IDPs in urban areas, where most are located, is a particular challenge

Counterinsurgency operations have eroded the distinction between combatants and civilians, who are often clubbed together with the "terrorists". Those living in areas controlled by NSAGs have been targeted with the aim of driving them out and depriving them of potential sources of support. Authorities in Iraq and Syria have increasingly relied on sectarian paramilitary forces that have not been held accountable for grave and widespread human rights abuses and the mass displacement of many thousands of families. The collapse of central authority in weaker states such Libya and Yemen has also driven displacement to a lesser extent.

As with previous incursions, Israel's military operation in the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 affected all 1.8 million people living in a small territory with a population density of 4,861 inhabitants per square kilometre. Two thousand people were killed during the incursion, in-
In 2014, 1.7 million people in Syria were in need of shelter support as of December 2014, with the governorates between Damascus and Aleppo being the worst affected. The areas most in need have high numbers of IDPs, have suffered extensive damage and destruction and are difficult to access. According to a multi-sectoral needs assessment carried out in 2014, 40 per cent of IDPs in need of shelter assistance were living in Aleppo governorate, which has been particularly hard-hit by the conflict. Up to 1.7 million people in Syria were in need of shelter support as of December 2014, with the governorates between Damascus and Aleppo being the worst affected. The areas most in need have high numbers of IDPs, have suffered extensive damage and destruction and are difficult to access. According to a multi-sectoral needs assessment carried out in 2014, 40 per cent of IDPs in need of shelter assistance were living in Aleppo governorate, which has been particularly hard-hit by the conflict.

Durable solutions are simply not a realistic prospect for the vast majority of the region’s IDPs

Food insecurity is a serious concern in the region. In Yemen, 41 per cent of children under five are stunted because of malnutrition, with the most acute cases prevalent among IDPs. Health facilities in conflict zones are often overstretched, damaged and sometimes out of IDPs’ reach. Israeli air strikes and artillery fire have damaged 17 of the Gaza Strip’s 32 hospitals. Libya’s health system is thought to be close to collapse, the result of a chronic shortage of medical supplies and the fact that most staff, who were expatriate in the first place, have fled the country.

Durable solutions

Given continuing conflicts and civil war in which all parties have deliberately targeted civilians, killing tens of thousands of people and driving millions into displacement, durable solutions are simply not a realistic prospect for the vast majority of the region’s IDPs. A few have managed to go back to their places of origin in the immediate aftermath of large-scale military operations, but most face major if not insurmountable obstacles to return, local integration or settlement elsewhere. Insecurity, high levels of violence, gross human rights abuses and the destruction of housing and infrastructure are all widespread, economies are weak and in some cases in danger of collapse and prospects for political reconciliation are remote.

The bombing of densely populated urban areas that accompanied Israel’s 2014 incursion into the Gaza Strip severely damaged at least 16,000 homes. It left 117,000 Palestinians living in protracted displacement as of the end of 2014, alongside around 16,000 still displaced after previous Israeli operations. Given Israel’s blockade, which among many other things severely restricts the import of building materials, durable solutions are all but beyond their reach.

At least 120,000 Palestinians live in protracted displacement in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the result not only of Israel’s discriminatory zoning policies and practices that support settlement expansion at the expense of Palestinians’ rights, but also because of the restrictions it imposes on where those affected can flee to.

The sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq has prevented many IDPs from returning or making a voluntary and informed choice about their preferred settlement option. Sectarian divisions are further complicated by the lack of national reconciliation and the absence of effective state authorities, as is also the case in Libya and Yemen.

215,400 people in Yemen, the majority in the south of country, were registered as returnees in November. Return, however, cannot necessarily be equated with the achievement of durable solutions, as many are still likely to have assistance and protection needs.

For hundreds of thousands of IDPs in Syria, return is simply not an option, given that 1.2 million homes, or 30 per cent of the country’s housing stock registered in the 2014 census, are thought to have been damaged or destroyed.

National and international response

Most governments in the region have failed to fulfil their international obligations to prevent and respond to displacement, leading to a lack of durable solutions and an ever-increasing rise in the number of IDPs living in protracted displacement.
In the West Bank including East Jerusalem, Israel has not only failed to prevent or respond to the displacement of Palestinians. It has intentionally caused it with the aim of changing the physical and demographic character of the territories it occupies. Israeli authorities have also hampered humanitarian efforts to help IDPs. They have even destroyed aid, which led ICRC to suspend its delivery of tents to displaced Palestinians in February 2014.

All parties to the conflict have prevented the delivery of international assistance since 2011, despite two UN Security Council resolutions calling for the restrictions to be eased. In Iraq's Kurdish region, where 1.45 million IDPs sought refuge in 2014, the authorities provided shelter for Kurds, Christian and Yazidi communities, but they sent Sunni, Shia and Turkmen IDPs back to temporary sites on the region's borders or elsewhere in Iraq.

The country has made noteworthy efforts to address displacement in terms of registering IDPs, coordinating between federal and local authorities and allocating cash allowances. That said, however, corruption, bureaucracy and political tensions at all levels have prevented an effective response, either for those newly displaced in 2014, or for the 1.1 million people who have been living in protracted displacement since as far back as 2006.

In Libya, a crisis committee set up by the prime minister in September to coordinate the delivery of assistance to IDPs was unable to fulfil its functions when the authorities collapsed, leaving most of the response to the Libyan Red Crescent Society and local tribes. Yemen's national policy on displacement, which was adopted in 2013, has not been implemented.

Despite such donations, all of the appeals were severely underfunded as of the end of 2014, with none of them reaching 50 per cent except for Yemen, which was funded at 54 per cent. As a result, the World Food Programme reduced its vital food distributions in Syria in September. Libya issued its first ever appeal, but less than two per cent of the modest $35 million request was funded.

The main challenge in terms of the international response has been one of access. The Syrian authorities have long prevented assistance from reaching opposition areas, while Israel has imposed a number of obstacles in Palestine, from permit regimes and closures to the destruction of aid supplies. The deteriorating security situation in Libya has forced international responders to relocate to Tunisia, and insecurity in Yemen has severely restricted humanitarian access. NSAGs such as ISIL have also targeted international humanitarian organisations and prevented the delivery of aid in areas under their control.

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IDMC estimates that there were at least 275,000 IDPs in occupied Palestine as of December 2014. All but a few were living in protracted displacement. They include at least 133,000 people forced to flee their homes by the recurrent hostilities in the Gaza Strip, and at least 142,000 in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, displaced as a result of wide-ranging Israeli policies and practices linked to the 1967 occupation. These estimates should not be understood as reflecting the full scale of displacement, because no cumulative and confirmed figures are available.

NGOs and observers continue to document and respond to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, which constitute major triggers of displacement. The underlying causes of the abuses, however, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general remain largely unaddressed, because Israel has taken the position that neither international human rights law nor the fourth Geneva Convention are applicable in the territories it occupies. As such, it fails to recognise its international obligations to prevent the displacement of Palestinians, and when it takes place to ensure durable solutions to their plight.

Instead, all Israeli governments since 1967 have displaced Palestinians while expanding their country’s territorial control, in support of the colonisation of what Israelis see as part of their ancestral homeland. Israel’s Supreme Court and the military legal corps have promoted and expanded settlements in the West Bank through restrictive and discriminatory regulations and policies.

These regulate all aspects of Palestinian life despite being illegal under international law. Palestinians have been excluded from planning schemes and land registration has been frozen since 1968, leaving most residents vulnerable to expropriation and evictions, the revocation of residency rights, housing demolitions, military incursions, the illegal expansion of settlements and settler violence.

The internal displacement of Palestinians results from these policies and practices, by virtue of which Israel has changed the physical character and demographic composition of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This means that Palestinian communities have not only been displaced by Israel’s destruc-
tion of their homes and livelihood structures, but also by forced evictions since 1967. The same policies expose IDPs to a set of coercive measures linked to settlement expansion and “closed military areas” that prevent them from making a voluntary and informed choice in terms of durable solutions.

In other words, returns are not allowed and locations to which people are forcibly displaced are dictated by Israel, because Palestinians have been left with no means of taking decisions about planning, construction and zoning.

In a context where the Israeli authorities are perpetrating forced displacement and are unwilling to respond to its consequences, the international humanitarian community struggles to deliver emergency aid, let alone make progress towards ending protracted displacement by helping IDPs achieve durable solutions.

In the Gaza Strip, the majority of those living in protracted internal displacement are also protracted refugees. The extent and severity of the damage and destruction wrought by Israel’s frequent military operations is the principal cause of protracted displacement. In August 2014, at least 16,000 homes were destroyed or severely damaged during operation Protective Edge. The majority of IDPs return to their homes once a ceasefire is in place, but Israel’s seven-year economic blockade of the territory makes effective reconstruction all but impossible.

The only building materials allowed into the Gaza Strip since 2007 are designated for international organisations and are subject to a complex and lengthy approval process. Based on the current operating capacity of the only crossing points for the transfer of goods, it would take around 20 years to import the aggregates required to complete housing reconstruction. This effectively means that the number of people living in protracted displacement in the Gaza Strip grows continuously, and faster than reconstruction is able to take place.

Palestine’s IDPs will only be able to achieve durable solutions to their displacement if a political solution to the 47-year-old occupation is found, the economic blockade of the Gaza Strip is lifted and the culture of impunity for human rights violations ended.
Figures and causes of displacement

There were at least 2.8 million IDPs in the Balkans, Caucasus, central Asia, Cyprus, Turkey and Ukraine as of the end of 2014. Most were displaced decades ago as a result of armed conflict, generalised violence and human rights violations. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Russia, people first fled their homes in the late 1980s or early 1990s as a result of inter-ethnic conflict that accompanied the breakup of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.

Displacement is more recent in Kosovo and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), where inter-ethnic conflict occurred in 1999 and 2001 respectively, and in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where authorities forcibly relocated people in the early 2000s. People have been displaced the longest in Cyprus and Turkey, since 1974 and 1986 respectively. In Cyprus, people fled their homes to escape conflict and communal violence. In Turkey, they were displaced by internal armed conflict between the security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, village raids and forced evacuations by the authorities.

The number of IDPs in the region rose by more than 685,000 during 2014. The increase was mainly the result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March and armed conflict between government and separatist forces in eastern Ukraine since April, which between them displaced at least 646,500 people. An increase of up to 25,500 was recorded in Azerbaijan and 26,100 in Georgia, where children born in displacement are eligible for status as IDPs.

The number of IDPs fell slightly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia as a result of returns, and in Russia because its five-year “forced migrant” status expired for some IDPs, which meant that people were no longer counted as IDPs regardless of whether they had achieved a durable solution. In the absence of new data for Armenia, Cyprus, Serbia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, figures remained the same as in 2013. The latest figure for Turkey,
from 2006, is at least 953,700, the highest in the region. FYR Macedonia had the fewest, with at least 200. No figures are available for the disputed territories of Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC).

Displacement figures for the region are compiled using different methodologies and definitions of what constitutes an IDP. Kosovo and Ukraine are the only countries that regularly issue figures, though in both cases they combine different data collection methodologies. In Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, the authorities grant legal status to IDPs in accordance with their domestic laws and policy frameworks on displacement. Status is granted and maintained based on whether a person is physically displaced or not, rather than their needs.

Displacement figures for the region are compiled using different methodologies and definitions of what constitutes an IDP

The figure for Bosnia and Herzegovina is probably an underestimate, because many Roma IDPs, who are among the country’s most vulnerable displaced people, often do not have the personal documents required for registration. In the other countries in the region, the current number of IDPs may be different from that given in the country figures table (see page 82) because figures are outdated. The figure for Serbia is the only one to broadly reflect the actual number of IDPs in need. It is based on a comprehensive profiling assessment in 2011, though the figure may have changed somewhat in the last three years. In Kosovo, a profiling exercise was initiated in 2014 to provide a more accurate picture of the number of IDPs in need. It is expected to be completed during 2015.

Data disaggregated by age and sex is available in just under half of the countries in the region: Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Turkey and Ukraine. In most, there are slightly more male than female IDPs, except for Ukraine where many men have stayed behind to protect family property or have chosen not to register as an IDP for fear their flight may be interpreted as evidence of support for Kiev. Others considered the status incompatible with the responsibilities traditionally incumbent on men. Adult and elderly IDPs are mostly female, bearing testimony to the significance of female-headed households.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a third of all households are headed by women, which may reflect the loss of male relatives during the conflict or labour migration abroad. In Kosovo, the displaced population is particularly young. Nearly 40 per cent of IDPs are children, not including those born in displacement. Ukraine has the highest percentage of elderly IDPs in the region. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women noted in 2014 that the authorities in Georgia did not adopt a gender-based approach when providing services to IDPs.

New displacement

Ukraine was the only country in which conflict caused new displacement in 2014. People were first displaced from Crimea in March, and then others fled the east of the country in increasing numbers as the conflict intensified. There have been reports of torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence, forced disappearances, harassment and indiscriminate attacks on civilians in disputed areas. As the front lines in the conflict have shifted, the distances IDPs have to cover to reach safety have also changed. Humanitarian access has been restricted by insecurity and the cumbersome regulations and procedures put in place by the Ukrainian authorities.

In areas of refugee, registration centres for IDPs have provided accommodation, humanitarian assistance and psychosocial support. Available housing, however, has become scarcer as the conflict drags on, and the vast majority of IDPs have had to seek refuge in private accommodation. This has proved a costly option for people whose financial situation was already compromised by Kiev’s decision to freeze all financial transactions in separatist-held territories, which has meant that salaries and pensions have not been paid for months. Crimean Tatars and Roma have been discriminated against, both in their places of origin and refuge.

Ukraine was the only country in which conflict caused new displacement in 2014

Protection issues

Many IDPs remain displaced in the region because they are unable to access adequate housing. The vast majority live in private accommodation that they rent, share, own or otherwise occupy. Little is known about their living conditions except for in Georgia, where some in private accommodation endure dire conditions. Homeowners have been excluded from government housing assistance, which they feel is unfair because their living conditions can be just as bad as those in collective centres.

Some IDPs in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Russia and Serbia have been living in collective centres for 20 years. Initially provided as temporary accommodation, living conditions have deteriorated over the years to the point of becoming a health and safety risk, despite numerous repairs to leaking roofs, broken sewage systems and dilapidated shared kitchens and bathrooms. Over time those who were able find alternative housing moved out, but many others – particularly elderly people, those with physical or mental disabilities, the chronically ill and people traumatised by gender-based violence – have been unable to secure other accommodation on their own.

Although not included in IDP figures in this report, returned IDPs continued to face protection issues in their places of origin in 2014. In Kosovo, they included insecurity, inadequate housing, poor infrastructure, limited opportunities to become self-reliant and hostile statements by municipal authorities about Serbs and Roma. Many returnees in Bosnia and Herzegovina have only been able to partially reconstruct their homes and the education system in some areas remains ethnically focused.
In Georgia some people in return areas were detained for crossing the fences set up by Russian forces since 2008 along the administrative border with South Ossetia in pursuit of their livestock. The fences, combined with poor infrastructure, loss of access to firewood, land and cattle, and the closure of markets, also worsen returned IDPs’ living conditions.

Returned IDPs in Abkhazia have faced an increased presence of Russian border guards too in recent years, when they cross into Georgia proper. They also continue to struggle to obtain birth certificates, passports and other documents required to make the crossing, restricting their access to better healthcare, markets, allowances and family visits. Some have crossed illegally and have been detained temporarily.

Some IDPs in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Russia and Serbia have been living in collective centres for 20 years

IDPs across the region struggle to access livelihoods and regain their self-reliance. Few have long-term jobs, and access to credit and land is difficult. Their coping mechanisms have included incurring debts, eating less, taking their children out of school and, in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, child labour. The majority of IDPs rely on social benefits as their main source of income.

Given that their needs related to their displacement have not been met after so many years, it is feared that some IDPs, such as those with disabilities or suffering trauma, may never be able to achieve self-reliance and will require specialised care, as has been the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia. Others lack the initiative to improve their financial situation on their own after years of dependence on aid. They require targeted support to develop the confidence, skills and motivation needed to regain their self-reliance.

Durable solutions

Some IDPs in the region have been displaced more than once, interrupting their pursuit of durable solutions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, IDPs who had previously fled conflict were displaced again in 2014 by the worst floods on record. Multiple displacement is not new to the region, where people displaced in the 1990s had to move again in the following years as unresolved simmering conflicts in Georgia, Russia and Turkey flared up again. Multiple displacement has further eroded the assets and coping mechanisms of those affected.

Hundreds of thousands of IDPs have returned, but many later moved back to their areas of refuge or on to a third location because of inadequate housing, a lack of jobs, limited access to services, poor infrastructure and insecurity, and in Kosovo and Turkey, the marginalisation of minority returnees.

In some cases, IDPs have shuttled between their places of origin and refuge, while in others different family members chose different options. In Georgia, for example, some decided to return to Abkhazia to protect their property, while others stayed to access better jobs, schools and healthcare.

Displacement in the region has become increasingly protracted, primarily because of the absence of political solutions to conflicts. In Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Georgia, IDPs’ places of origin are still not under government control. Peace negotiations continued in Azerbaijan and Georgia during 2014 and in Cyprus they resumed after a two-year break, but none produced tangible results. The return of IDPs to Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and TRNC was still impossible.

Unresolved property issues also obstruct the achievement of durable solutions, and in Azerbaijan and Georgia, remedies for restitution or compensation have not been instituted. They have, however, been put in place in Cyprus, where more than 750 cases had been settled by 2014, mainly in favour of compensation.

Around 181,000 families in Turkey and more than 3,200 in Russia have received compensation, but the amount was not enough for them to rebuild their homes.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, some IDPs succeeded in legally recovering their property but did not return to it after discovering that it had been unlawfully occupied or that they could not afford to rebuild.

Displacement in the region has become increasingly protracted, primarily because of the absence of political solutions to conflicts.

Others still have legal claims pending, complicated in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the fact that the defendant is an institution that no longer exists, and in Kosovo by authorities’ ineffective response to fraudulent transactions and illegal occupation of empty reconstructed property. Access to justice for ethnic Serbs in Kosovo is hampered by lengthy and expensive proceedings, and the fact that courts do not recognise the Serbian language or property documents.

In most countries, landless IDPs and those unable to document their previous residence have not been offered remedies, as has been the case for Roma IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

National and international response

National authorities in the region increasingly acknowledge local integration and settlement elsewhere as options for IDPs’ durable solutions in addition to return. In 2014 the Georgian government continued to renovate collective centres and transfer ownership to IDPs, and to resettle others in alternative housing, sometimes building new apartments for them. In Serbia, the closure of all collective centres is planned by the end of 2015 and an EU-funded project is to build 60 new homes by 2016. Similar plans are in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where authorities were building social housing in 2014. The authorities in Kosovo said they intended to move IDPs from collective centres to improved accommodation and support return for those who wish to do so.

The governments in Georgia and Azerbaijan have paid IDPs a monthly
allowance since the beginning of their displacement. In 2014, the Georgian authorities switched from making the payments in accordance with beneficiaries’ status as IDPs to a system based on family income, a first in the region. The authorities in Armenia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan failed to pay IDPs enough attention or respond to their needs. Humanitarian access to IDPs and returnees in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea remained limited, and information on their situation is scarce.

Decades of international humanitarian interventions geared towards short-term support have improved the lives of many IDPs. They have not, however, succeeded in ending displacement and such assistance has dwindled over the years as organisations move on to other crises. That said, the EU instrument for pre-accession assistance in the Balkans and other international initiatives have provided significant support for durable solutions.

Countries in the region should follow Serbia and Kosovo in conducting a profiling exercise of their IDPs to inform durable solutions programmes that correspond to their needs and wishes. The OSCE’s protection checklist for displaced populations and affected communities was rolled out in Ukraine in 2014 and contributed to improved reporting on IDPs’ protection issues, information that should be useful to the numerous agencies operating in the country.

Eight of the 13 countries in the region with displaced populations have adopted laws or policies on displacement. Georgia’s Law on IDPs entered into force in March 2014, marking a major policy shift from status-based to needs-based assistance. It provides for the protection of IDPs’ rights and their reintegration, takes the realities of protracted displacement into account and includes provisions for adequate rather than only temporary housing.

In October 2014, Ukraine adopted a resolution on the “registration of internally displaced persons from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and anti-terrorist operation area” and the Law on IDPs’ Rights and Freedoms. Both are important steps towards IDPs’ protection, but their definitions of an IDP differ, leading to inconsistencies in the registration process and excluding some, such as those without Ukrainian citizenship.

Kosovo does not have a legislative framework for IDPs’ protection, but the results of its profiling exercise are expected to inform a discussion on the development of a law or policy.

IDP VOICES

**Ukraine**

**Luda Zdorovetz, 26**
Dzerzhisk, Donetsk oblast
Makeevka, Donetsk oblast
As of 25 December 2014, they were residing in rental housing in Kyiv.

Our lives are now divided into “before and after”. Before the war, I was working in marketing, and Anton and his father were developing their small business assembling and restoring furniture. Life was quiet and peaceful.

Then the war came to our towns and turned everything upside down. What made it worse is that we ended up on different sides of the barricades, because Makeevka had already been captured by the rebels. What could we do? General decline, constant fear for the lives of our loved ones, panic, that’s how we lived. Of course, that couldn’t last long. In early December we fled to Kyiv.

We are not alone here. Many of our friends had left our hometown even before we did. In this sense it was easier, at least emotionally. We are worried about our parents who stayed behind though. They don’t want to leave their homes.

We don’t know what’s going to happen next, and not knowing makes it more difficult. We had a hard time finding housing and jobs, of course. But that doesn’t stop us from living and working and believing in a better outcome. What else can we do?

We are busy working in a home bakery and during our spare time we volunteer with organisations that are helping the displaced people. Don’t stop halfway, don’t give up! Everything will turn out well. It can’t be any other way.

**Anton Leonenko, 27**
Nearly 20 years after the end of a conflict that displaced around a million people, there were still at least 100,400 IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the end of 2014.202 The true number is likely to be higher, given that the figure only represents those who have obtained legal status as a “displaced person” and their children. Around 580,000 IDPs have returned to their homes.203

The vast majority of those still displaced live in private accommodation, but around 8,500 live in collective centres, the temporary shelter they were allocated some two decades ago. They are being resettled to social housing. Some IDPs and returnees were displaced again in 2014 by the worst floods and landslides on record, reigniting past trauma for some.

Over two decades of displacement, the number of IDPs decreased dramatically twice. The first fall was from 1996 to 1997 and followed the cessation of hostilities and a push by the government and the international community for their return. The second was from 2000 to 2005 as a result of housing reconstruction and the property law implementation plan. The plan resolved nearly 94 per cent of more than 200,000 property claims.204 Most IDPs returned to areas where they formed part of the ethnic majority.

IDPs who return and repossess their property lose their “displaced person” status, but this cannot be equated with the achievement of durable solutions. The sustainability of returns has not been monitored, and many returnees have left again, including because of the poor living conditions they encountered and the unlawful secondary occupation of their property.

Since 2007, the number of IDPs returning to their pre-war homes has flat-lined. Many who wished to return have already done so, though others are still in need of assistance to rebuild their homes or are entangled in legal battles to reclaim their property. Some are also unwilling to return to areas that witnessed gross human rights abuses and where the perpetrators have either gone unpunished or have been released from prison after serving their sentence.

For IDPs who have returned to areas where they are in the ethnic minority, a lack of acknowledgement of events during the war and the commemoration only of victims from the local ethnic majority hinders their ability to move on from their wartime traumas. On 31 May 2014, par-
First grade primary school children at the Mihatovici collective centre, attending their classes with scarce school materials and no heating. After the classes they go ‘home’ to Norwegian-built barracks from 1994, many with no food on the table – food comes from the public cuisine in the collective centre. After graduating from primary school the majority do not go on to secondary school as transport costs to the nearby town of Tuzla are too high for these families. The majority of IDPs in Mihatovici originally come from the eastern Bosnia- Srebrenica, Zepce, Bratunac and Zvornik. They have been waiting since 1995 for a ‘durable solution’. Photo: CESI, February 2014

ents of children killed or disappeared in the town of Prijedor during the war, many of whom are returnees, gathered to rally against local authorities’ refusal to publicly acknowledge the killing of more than 3,100 civilians, 102 of whom were children.205 Such protests are typical across the country.

The number of attacks on returnees has declined over the years, but they still take place, and displaced and returnee children continue to be educated separately from their counterparts in the local population according to their ethnicity. All of which shows that ethnic reconciliation is still a work in progress and tensions remain.

Justice for the grave violations of international humanitarian law that IDPs and others suffered during the war is essential to the achievement of durable solutions. Violations include mass killings, torture, systematic rape, forced labour and confinement to camps. Remedies to address them have been put in place, including social protection and benefits for the civilian victims of war. Truth commissions have been established in Bijelina, Sarajevo and Srebrenica, commemorations take place and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and domestic courts have prosecuted some perpetrators. ICTY’s mandate came to an end in 2014 after making 69 convictions.206 Many IDPs, however, are still waiting for justice.

In 2009, the council of ministers mandated the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees to develop a national transitional justice strategy with UNDP’s support.207 The strategy is a comprehensive framework for dealing with the legacy of human rights violations and war crimes, and includes provisions on fact finding, truth telling, reparations, memorials and institutional reforms. It was drafted through a consultative process with national and international NGOs and civil society.

The strategy document and its accompanying action plan are still awaiting endorsement by the council of ministers. The failure to adopt them so far has benefited those who profit from the status quo and often inflame ethnic tensions for political gain, as was seen during the 2014 elections.208 Protracted displacement will continue until ethnic divisions have been overcome and IDPs and returnees have received redress for the injustices they suffered.
As of the end of 2014, there were at least 4.1 million IDPs in south Asia, an increase of 1.8 million on the previous year. Pakistan accounted for 46 per cent of the region’s displaced population, Afghanistan and India a fifth each, Bangladesh 10 per cent, Sri Lanka two per cent and Nepal one per cent.

The number of IDPs in Pakistan increased from at least 746,700 to at least 1.9 million as insurgency and counterinsurgency operations intensified, reversing a slow downward trend since 2009 when the end of year figure was 1.2 million. In Afghanistan, armed conflict, the activities of NSAGs – including targeted killings, kidnappings and the use of improvised explosive devices – and inter-tribal and other community disputes continued to drive displacement as in previous years. The number of IDPs increased from at least 631,000 to at least 805,400.

The figure for India increased from at least 526,000 to at least 853,900 mainly as a result of inter-communal violence. Small-scale inter-communal violence continued to cause displacement in Bangladesh, but the number of people affected is not known. The increase in Bangladesh from up to 280,000 to at least 431,000 is not the result of new displacement in 2014, but rather our inclusion of more than 151,000 Urdu speakers forced to flee in 1971, who were not previously considered IDPs. The estimates for Nepal and Sri Lanka are the same as in 2013.

The data available on displacement varies considerably from one country to another, depending on the level of monitoring by national authorities, civil society...
groups and international organisations, and media coverage.

The number of IDPs in Pakistan’s north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is based on the number of families UNHCR registers on behalf of the provincial authorities.213 Not all IDPs are captured, however, and others remain registered despite no longer being displaced. Insecurity restricts humanitarian access, meaning that profiling data does not cover all IDPs nor all areas affected by displacement.214 Information on Balochistan province comes from media sources. KP, FATA and Afghanistan are the only areas of south Asia for which data disaggregated by sex and age is available. It indicates that the displaced population is made up of more men than women and more children than adults.215

In Afghanistan, UNHCR provides monthly updates on the number of IDPs profiled, but they tend to underestimate the true situation because not all are interviewed immediately after their flight, the result of resource constraints and insecurity that prevents access to some areas. IDPs may only be profiled a couple of months after their displacement, once their areas of refuge become accessible to humanitarians, if they are profiled at all.216

The data available on displacement varies considerably from one country to another.

In Sri Lanka, UNHCR’s last compilation of local government statistics dates back to December 2012. It is also likely to be an underestimate, because in 2010, a year after the end of the conflict, the government began deregistering IDPs without determining whether or not they had achieved durable solutions. Deregistration continued in 2013 and 2014, resulting in very low official figures.217

In Bangladesh and India, neither the government nor international organisations provided comprehensive displacement data for 2014. Estimates rely on information from local NGOs and media, which tend to focus on individual events and only report numbers immediately after people flee their homes. They rarely provide information with which to assess how IDPs’ situations evolve over time. The premature closure of camps in India prevented the collection of data beyond the emergency phase. Our 2014 figures for Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka are based wholly or partly on past estimates, in part because of the lack of new information and in part because the situations in each country make it unlikely that IDPs have achieved durable solutions.

Displacement in the region is driven by armed conflict and generalised violence, such as inter-communal clashes to which minority groups in Bangladesh and India are particularly exposed. In Afghanistan, NSAGs took effective control of more territory, particularly in rural areas of the south and east of the country. Government forces partially contained their expansion. Insecurity in the country as a whole worsened as the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) drew to an end, and the number of civilian deaths increased by 25 per cent compared with 2013.218 This made access to IDPs more difficult, particularly in the south and east. In Pakistan, NSAGs sought to expand their power bases and territorial control in 2014, and government forces pushed them back.

Most IDPs in Bangladesh and India belong to ethnic or religious minorities. In Bangladesh, indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Hindus and Buddhists across the country were particularly affected by inter-communal violence, but the number of people newly displaced is not known.219 Armed gangs also attacked Hindus and indigenous people during the January 2014 presidential elections, leading to some displacement, but again little information is available as to its extent.220 In India, Adivasis and Muslims in western Assam, where both are local minorities, were disproportionately affected by inter-communal violence.221

Land issues were also a significant driver of past conflict in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and failure to resolve them has led to displacement becoming protracted. The same is true of other issues, including inter-communal violence.

Disasters triggered by natural hazards displace hundreds of thousands if not millions of people each year in south Asia. It is not unusual for people already displaced by conflict to be affected.

New displacement and displacement patterns

New displacement in the region increased fourfold, from 328,000 in 2013 to more than 1.4 million in 2014. As in the previous year, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan accounted for all new displacement, and figures for each country increased. Pakistani military operations against insurgents in FATA’s North Waziristan and Khyber agencies caused the largest new displacements of the year, with up to 907,000 people forced to flee their homes compared with 140,000 in 2013.

Disasters triggered by natural hazards displace hundreds of thousands if not millions of people each year in south Asia. It is not unusual for people already displaced by conflict to be affected.

In India, at least 345,000 people were newly displaced, five times as many as in 2013. NSAG violence targeting Adivasis in western Assam was responsible for the vast majority of new displacement, forcing 300,000 to flee their homes in December.222 The remainder were displaced by inter-communal violence in western Assam in May, along Assam’s border with Nagaland in August and by cross-border skirmishes between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir in October and December.223

Armed conflict between Afghanistan’s armed forces and ISAF on the one hand and various NSAGs on the other displaced at least 150,000 people, up from 124,000 in 2013. As in previous years, most of the new displacement took place in the south and east, but there was also an increase in central areas of the country.224

With the exception of 104,000 IDPs in Pakistan who returned during the year,
most of those newly displaced in the region were still living in displacement at the end of 2014. IDPs tended to seek refuge near their places of origin, with most in India fleeing to camps within or near their home districts. The majority of IDPs from North Waziristan and Khyber moved to nearby districts in KP province. Most chose to stay with host communities rather than in camps, in part because taking refuge in government-run sites makes them a target for NSAGs. In Afghanistan, IDPs took shelter with host communities or in informal settlements. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, most were living outside of camps including with host communities.

There is evidence to suggest that significant numbers of IDPs flee to urban areas, but they are not systematically monitored and as such it is impossible to estimate the number of people involved across the region as a whole. In Afghanistan, however, 40 per cent of the country’s IDPs, or more than 322,000 people, make up part of the urban poor in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kandahar. They perceive urban areas as relatively safe and as providing better access to infrastructure and livelihoods. People who have undertaken some form of migration, be they IDPs, returned refugees or economic migrants, make up the majority of the population in these cities.225

Members of minority groups are often discriminated against during their displacement

Protection issues

Threats to IDPs’ physical security varied both between and within countries in 2014. In Pakistan, NSAGs targeted displacement camps because they are government-run. In May, June and September, such attacks killed and injured IDPs in two camps in the Peshawar and Hangu districts of KP. The Hangu attack forced the majority of the camp’s population to seek temporary refuge elsewhere.216

In Bangladesh, simmering tensions linked to unresolved land issues periodically lead to clashes that affect IDPs. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, displaced indigenous people were injured and arrested in June following clashes with the paramilitary forces that evicted them from their home area. The same month in Dhaka, slum residents including IDPs from the country’s Urdu-speaking minority were killed and injured, allegedly as part of a campaign to forcibly evict them.217

IDPs across south Asia lack access to drinking water, food, sanitation, shelter, education, livelihoods and tenure security. Those living in informal urban settlements in Afghanistan are worse off than others among the urban poor in terms of access to food and livelihoods. This is particularly true for people recently displaced, as they have little access to local networks that might enable them to borrow money to make up for the shortfall in their incomes.220

Members of minority groups are often discriminated against during their displacement. Despite their Bangladeshi citizenship being officially recognised since 2008, displaced Urdu-speakers living in urban slum-like settlements still have difficulty in obtaining passports because their addresses give away their ethnicity and the fact that they are displaced.229

In Sri Lanka, ethnic Tamils make up the overwhelming majority of IDPs, with some Muslims also still displaced. Both groups are minorities and the government has not prioritised a response to their needs, prolonging their displacement.226

Durable solutions

There was little progress towards durable solutions across the region in 2014. Continuing insecurity in Afghanistan and Pakistan rendered returns to many areas of origin unsustainable if not impossible. No returns were documented in Afghanistan, though there were reports of short-term displacement followed by returns in insecure areas without humanitarian access. No further information was available.231 The presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) prevent many IDPs from returning, and clearance teams are among those NSAGs target, making their work more dangerous still.233

In Pakistan, 104,000 IDPs moved back to their places of origin during the year, including 45,000 people displaced from North Waziristan in January and March 2014 who returned soon afterwards.233 It is unclear, however, whether any returns were sustainable given continued insecurity and the extent of damage and destruction in some areas. Further counterinsurgency operations in North Waziristan forced more people to flee from May through to the end of the year, this time in much larger numbers.234 More than 24,000 IDPs displaced from Khyber in 2012 returned in May, but counterinsurgency operations from October onwards caused further displacement. Many who had returned to the agency since 2008 were forced to flee their homes for a second time.235

The majority of IDPs in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka live in protracted displacement, and in the absence of systematic monitoring, progress towards durable solutions is difficult to assess. Evidence suggests, however, that obstacles remain, including continued inter-communal tensions and violence in north-eastern India and Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts.

In Sri Lanka, the scale of the military presence in the north of the country and state surveillance of Tamil civilians have made it more difficult for IDPs and those who have returned since the end of the conflict in 2009 to re-establish sustainable livelihoods and rebuild their lives.236 It is hoped that the change of government in January 2015 may help to facilitate durable solutions.

Authorities in Afghanistan, particularly at the provincial level, have not helped IDPs to integrate locally, despite the majority expressing a preference to do so and the inclusion of all three settlement options in the country’s policy on displacement.237 In other countries of the region, IDPs’ settlement preferences are not known.

Tenure insecurity is also an obstacle to the achievement of durable solutions. In Afghanistan, addressing disputes through formal and customary justice mechanisms at the local level remains a challenge, and discrimination makes it particularly difficult for displaced women to exercise their housing, land and property rights.238 Urban IDPs in Afghanistan and those in both rural and urban areas of Bangladesh live with the threat of forced eviction, because their tenure has not
been formalised. In Sri Lanka, the occupation and acquisition of IDPs’ land by the state continues to prevent returns and prolong displacement. Tenants displaced from the land and homes they had been renting have not been compensated.

National and international response

The responses of the Indian and Bangladeshi governments to displacement caused by conflict and inter-communal violence were ad-hoc and piecemeal in 2014. Responses across the region tended to focus on emergency assistance rather than the establishment of conditions that facilitate durable solutions.

Afghanistan’s government adopted a comprehensive policy on displacement in February 2014, but following contested presidential elections in April and delays in the formation of a unity government, the dissemination and roll-out of the policy through workshops and sensitisation with local stakeholders only started in selected provinces in the autumn.

Some countries have been reluctant even to acknowledge displacement caused by conflict and violence, which has prevented them from developing comprehensive frameworks for response. Sri Lanka’s resettlement policy, for example, focuses only on the emergency phase and is not in line with international standards. It has languished in draft form since 2013, and the last government did not carry out or support a comprehensive assessment of the country’s IDPs. India and Bangladesh received international support to respond to displacement caused by disasters during the year, and in the case of India, also for some caused by conflict and violence. Local NGOs are largely left to assist those affected on their own, but their capacity to respond is limited.

International humanitarian organisations continued to support national and local authorities on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, coordinating their response through the cluster system and, in the case of Afghanistan, a working group and task forces on IDPs. Insecurity and restricted humanitarian access, however, prevented a needs-based response in many cases.

Funding for international humanitarian work has also been dwindling. While 67 per cent of funding for the 2014 strategic response plan for Afghanistan had been covered by the end of the year, the total amount of funding requested was the lowest since 2002. The national demining programme, which is crucial to the achievement durable solutions, is also chronically underfunded. A lack of funding for programming in Pakistan means that both international aid and government assistance tend to prioritise people newly displaced over those living in protracted displacement, perpetuating the latter’s plight.

Most existing development programmes and frameworks, including those of regional and international bodies such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and UN development agencies, fail to mention durable solutions for IDPs. The exception is Afghanistan, which has received more official development assistance than any other country worldwide each year since 2007. UNDP’s draft country programme for 2015 to 2019 lists IDPs among its beneficiaries and plans measures including livelihood support to help them achieve durable solutions. Afghanistan is also a pilot country for the UN secretary general’s framework on ending displacement in the aftermath of conflict, but ongoing fighting and displacement seriously hampered its implementation.

International humanitarian organisations continued to reduce their presence in Sri Lanka in 2014, and development work, including that taking place under the under UN’s development assistance framework for 2013 to 2017, continues to focus on populations and areas affected by conflict rather than on IDPs themselves. This despite a recommendation to the contrary by the special rapporteur on IDPs’ human rights in June.

In Bangladesh, neither the local consultative group made up of government, international development partners and UN agencies for the country-wide coordination of development work nor the Chittagong Hill Tracts development facility managed by UNDP included a focus on displacement or durable solutions.
SRI LANKA
Militarisation and land occupation

Internally displaced children studying in their temporary shelter in Trinco-malee district. Their families were displaced from Sampur in 2006, and cannot return because their home area, first declared a high security zone and later a special economic zone, remains closed for resettlement. Photo: Mirak Raheem, January 2015
Sri Lanka is an example of the way displacement becomes increasingly difficult to resolve the longer it lasts, particularly when there is no political will to do so. We estimate that there were as many as 90,000 IDPs in Northern and Eastern provinces as of December 2014, all of them living in protracted displacement. The majority were displaced before April 2008. Almost six years after the end of the country’s 26-year civil war, they continue to face obstacles in exercising their rights and addressing their needs. Of the hundreds of thousands of IDPs who have returned, tens of thousands are likely to have outstanding needs related to their displacement.247

When the conflict ended in May 2009, the majority of the population of Northern province with the exception of Jaffna had been displaced at least once and many several times, as had significant numbers of people in Jaffna and Eastern province. A large majority of the country’s protracted IDPs, as well as those who experienced displacement in the past, belong to the Tamil ethnic group. It is not known how many among the 25,000 Sinhalese displaced by fighting after 1983 are still living as IDPs. The same is true of the 75,000 Muslims the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam expelled from Northern province in 1990.249

Sri Lanka lacks comprehensive data on its IDPs, and little up-to-date information is available. The results of the government’s exercise with UNHCR to reconcile figures and its joint needs assessment with OCHA, both undertaken in 2014, were not available at the time of writing. Available numbers250 are unlikely to reflect the true scale of displacement, given that the government has deregistered IDPs since 2010 without carrying out a durable solutions assessment.251

Lack of access to housing, land and property rights has proved a significant obstacle to IDPs’ long-term solutions. The last government undermined the country’s legislative and policy framework on land tenure by evicting residents in the north and in Colombo.252 IDPs’ loss of land in the north, for which most have received no compensation, has limited their access to sustainable livelihoods, and their situation is made worse by the absence of a mechanism to resolve land disputes. Around 20,000 IDPs are unable to return to their land because it is occupied by the military, or has been acquired by the state under the Land Acquisition Act for questionable public purposes, including a military-run holiday resort. Tenants have faced particular challenges in returning.253

Sri Lanka’s protracted IDPs include the inhabitants of Mullikulam in Mannar district and Sampur in Trincomalee district, who were forced to flee in 2007. Mullikulam is occupied by the navy, and the military established a high security zone in Sampur, part of which was later transformed into a special industrial area. The IDPs live in temporary shelters near their home areas and are unable to practice their original livelihood of fishing because they no longer have access to the sea.254

Current and former IDPs running small businesses in Northern province struggle to compete with the military’s agricultural and tourism ventures, some of which are based on IDPs’ own land.255 Many displaced female heads of household, particularly war widows, face obstacles accessing land they have inherited from a deceased spouse or family member.256

Under the last government, the surveillance of civilians and draconian powers enshrined in the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act endangered the safety of current and former IDPs and contributed to displacement becoming protracted.257 The high ratio of security force personnel to civilians in the north, estimated at one to five, and their extensive involvement in matters usually reserved for the civilian realm are indicative of the militarisation that took place.258

Sri Lanka has no national policy or legislation on displacement to provide a framework for addressing protracted IDPs’ needs. A 2013 draft policy, which was never finalised, falls short of international standards, including the Guiding Principles.259 Development organisations, which have continued to work in the country after the UN humanitarian cluster system was phased out in 2013, have not included a focus on displacement in their programming to facilitate durable solutions for IDPs. OCHA scaled down its presence to a small humanitarian advisory team in December 2014.
Figures and causes of displacement

There were 854,900 IDPs displaced by conflict and violence in south-east Asia as of the end of 2014, down four per cent from 887,000 a year earlier. The gentle decline reflects an overall trend in the region over the past decade. Around 134,000 people were newly displaced during the year, 65 per cent fewer than in 2013. This was mainly the result of a reduction in the number and intensity of violent incidents, particularly in Myanmar and the Philippines where the largest displacements have taken place in recent years.

Around 95 per cent of the region’s IDPs are concentrated in three countries. Myanmar has 645,300, Indonesia at least 84,000 and the Philippines 77,700. There are thought to be around 35,000 people displaced in Thailand and 7,500 in Papua New Guinea. Displacement in Laos and Timor-Leste is small-scale but unresolved.

Gathering data on displacement presents a number of challenges across the region, mainly related to the lack of a common and standardised definition of what constitutes an IDP. Poor resources at the local level and limited access to some areas affected by violence also hamper the task. Data disaggregated by sex and age was only collected in Myanmar’s Rakhine, Kachin and northern Shan states and to a lesser extent in the Philippines’s city of Zamboanga. Elsewhere in the region the lack of such data was a barrier to providing an adequate response to the needs of the most vulnerable IDPs.

Fighting between government forces and NSAGs was the main cause of displacement in 2014, forcing people to flee their homes in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and southern Thailand. Inter-communal violence between ethnic and religious groups, often triggered by disputes over land and resources, also caused displacement in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

No new major armed conflicts flared up in the region. In the Philippines, the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in March 2014 put an official end to 40 years of conflict between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front ( MILF) in Mindanao.

In many south-east Asian countries, displacement is multi-causal. Natural haz-
hards, conflict and development projects combine to create not only an environment conducive to flight, but also conditions that increase IDPs’ vulnerability and undermine their resilience. Millions of people in the region are displaced each year by disasters caused by natural hazards, but there is no data on the scale of displacement triggered by development projects.

**New displacement and displacement patterns**

Most new displacements in 2014 were short-term and IDPs returned home within a matter of days or weeks. The majority sought refuge with friends or family, but others went into hiding in the forest for fear of suffering abuses at the hands of military forces or NSAGs. Most stayed as close as possible to their homes so as to be able to return as soon as conditions allowed.

Around 95 per cent of the region’s IDPs are concentrated in three countries. Myanmar has 645,300, Indonesia at least 84,000 and the Philippines 77,700

The Philippines accounted for the majority of new displacements. Around 124,000 people fled their homes to escape armed conflict, the main cause, and criminal and clan-related violence. 260 IDPs were concentrated in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The largest displacement was caused by a military operation launched in early 2014 against the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, a MILF breakaway group opposed to the peace process. Around 48,000 people were displaced in North Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces. Some left in anticipation of the violence, and others fled government air strikes and shelling. Most sought refuge with host families or built temporary shelters, though a smaller number made for government-run camps.

The largest new displacement in Myanmar took place in Kachin state in April, when government forces clashed with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) near the border with China. The fighting lasted for a week and forced 2,700 people to flee, many of whom had been displaced by violence before. Some crossed the border into China, but most took shelter in camps within Kachin. 261 Fighting between the military and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army displaced another 2,000 people in the south-east of the country in October. Some sought refuge in nearby villages, but others went into hiding in the jungle to escape alleged violence and abuses by the military, including intimidation and forced labour. 262

The majority of those displaced by fighting between the Indonesian military and the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) in Papua and West Papua provinces also fled into the forest, a pattern of displacement observed in previous years. They included those displaced by counter-insurgency operations in the Puncak Jaya region of Papua in January. 263 Elsewhere in Indonesia, inter-communal violence continued to cause sporadic displacement. In August, 500 people were displaced when a long-standing land dispute between two villages in East Nusa Tenggara province turned violent. 264 Most sought refuge in neighbouring villages.

**Protection issues**

Armed conflict and the excesses of both state forces and NSAGs put IDPs’ lives and physical security at risk across the region in 2014. In Myanmar, IDPs in Kachin and northern Shan states faced threats from ongoing fighting, anti-personnel mines and UXO, human trafficking, forced recruitment and sexual violence. 265 They also experienced harassment and interrogation in camps. In May, the military arrested 14 IDPs in Kachin on suspicion of being KIA members. 266

In the Philippines, indigenous people who fled the militarisation of their community in Mindanao’s Agusan del Sur province in November said the military had harassed them in their camps and accused them of being members of the New People’s Army. 270

IDPs in most of the region’s displacement camps lacked access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and adequate sanitation facilities. Local authorities were only willing or able to provide basic relief on a temporary basis, and residents were often expected to return to their places of origin after a few weeks or months, or to find alternative solutions on their own. The living conditions of those who failed to do so deteriorated over time, and those belonging to ethnic or religious minorities were at risk of further marginalisation and vulnerability.

In July, the UN highlighted the “deplorable” living conditions in camps in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where tens of thousands of people displaced in 2012 by inter-communal violence between Rakhine Buddhists on the one hand, and Rohingya Muslims on the other, have been living for more than two years without access to adequate water, sanitation or healthcare. The special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar said some displaced Rohingya Muslims had died in their camps because they were unable to access emergency medical attention. 271 Unable to leave their camps and villages because of movement restrictions imposed by the government, Rohingya IDPs also struggle to find livelihood opportunities.

**In many south-east Asian countries, displacement is multi-causal**

Around 20,000 IDPs were still living in camps and transit sites in the Philippine city of Zamboanga at the end of 2014, more than 15 months after being displaced by fighting between the government and a faction of the Moro National Liberation Front. They have struggled to access basic services, in particular water and healthcare, and more than 200 people have died in displacement, half of them children under five. Pneumonia was the leading cause of death. 272 Children were also at risk of malnutrition. An October 2014 survey conducted in camps and transit sites showed that more than half of those over two years old were stunted. 273

In Papua New Guinea, around 4,000 IDPs displaced by inter-communal vio-
Durable solutions

The majority of south-east Asia’s IDPs live in protracted displacement. Some have been displaced for up to 15 years and few were able to return, integrate locally or settle elsewhere during 2014. In the absence of monitoring, it is difficult to estimate how many IDPs may have achieved durable solutions, but evidence suggests they face significant obstacles in doing so. The longer displacement goes on, the less data is available on IDPs’ needs and whereabouts. There is little information available on the assistance and protection needs of IDPs who take refuge outside official camps. The relative invisibility of those living with host families or in rented accommodation means they are often overlooked by responders, who also tend to assume that their needs are less acute than those of IDPs in camps.

A profiling exercise conducted in 2014 among IDPs living in host communities in Zamboanga found otherwise. It revealed respondents’ main concerns to be lack of access to shelter, healthcare and livelihoods. Some had received humanitarian assistance, but less than a third were able to provide for their families’ basic needs because they had depleted their assets and lost their livelihoods as a result of their displacement.276

In Myanmar, ongoing fighting, the presence of UXO and landmines, and failure to restore HLP rights continued to hamper returns in Kachin and northern Shan states. In Rakhine state, Muslim IDPs’ lack of freedom of movement continued to prevent them from accessing healthcare, education and livelihoods. In Kachin and northern Shan states, the Myanmar armed forces have also given IDPs’ land to agribusinesses. Without formal tenure documents, those affected were unable to reclaim their property.277 Governments often encourage return, but in some cases they have used security considerations to prevent it in favour of relocation. They have tended, however, not to consult or inform IDPs properly about such moves, the upshot being that those relocated struggle to access basic services and livelihoods and generally to rebuild their lives.

In Zamboanga, the main obstacle to return has been slow progress in rebuilding the 10,000 homes destroyed during the conflict. The city government’s decision to declare “no-build zones” in Muslim-majority coastal areas where many IDPs had their homes has also been a factor, as has weak tenure security. The authorities have prioritised those who own land for return and assistance, leaving those without formal tenure living in protracted displacement in camps and transit sites.278 Many were forced to move to such places in 2014, where without adequate access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, they have been unable to start their recovery and face deepening poverty and vulnerability.

For those attempting to integrate locally or settle elsewhere, their lack of access to land, basic services and livelihood opportunities has impeded their pursuit of durable solutions. Many do not have tenure security, and without it they may also face the risk of eviction. Many are unable to afford to buy and register land, and competition for scarce resources, including land, has been a source of tensions and clashes between IDPs and their host communities. This has been the case in West Timor, the Indonesian portion of the island of Timor, where around 22,000 IDPs displaced in 1999 are still living in protracted displacement in camps.279

National and international response

Several countries in the region took concrete steps to meet IDPs’ assistance and protection needs in 2014, particularly during the emergency relief phase. Most have failed, however, to put policies and resources in place to address their long-term recovery needs effectively. All too often displacement is seen as a temporary problem requiring only short-term solutions, and decisions to wind down humanitarian assistance often do not coincide with IDPs’ needs having been met.

In Zamboanga, the city government announced the end of the humanitarian phase in August, but IDPs still had significant needs and no early recovery strategy was put in place to ensure a smooth transition between humanitarian and development interventions. The authorities have made repeated commitments to prioritise long-term solutions, but progress has been only limited.

The Indonesian government made a number of efforts to address protracted displacement. The national development agency held consultations in early 2014 with local authorities in West Timor and international agencies working in the province, with the aim of using their experiences to inform the country’s medium-term development plan for 2015 to 2019.280 In March, the president instructed minis-
tries to improve the handling of “social conflicts” and continue efforts to address people’s post-conflict needs, including those of IDPs. Whether such commitments have translated into improvements on the ground is unclear.

No new legislative frameworks on displacement were adopted in the region in 2014, but significant progress was made in the Philippines, where the lower house of congress adopted a bill in August covering people displaced by both conflict and disasters.

International response efforts continued in Myanmar, the Philippines and to a lesser extent Papua New Guinea. In other countries, such as Indonesia and Timor Leste, humanitarians were no longer engaged and the shift to recovery was considered complete, although in reality IDPs continued to face challenges.

Several countries took steps to meet IDPs’ assistance and protection needs in 2014, particularly during the emergency relief phase. Most failed, however, to put policies and resources in place to address their long-term recovery needs.

International assistance plays a significant role in plugging gaps in government responses to displacement, particularly in Myanmar and the Philippines. That said, restricted humanitarian access to some areas of Myanmar affected by conflict and displacement, such as Kachin and northern Shan states, hampered responders’ efforts. In Rakhine state, international staff have also been harassed, threatened and accused of bias in favour of Muslim IDPs when providing aid.

Efforts to plan for recovery and long-term solutions as early as possible in the relief phase and to engage the development sector in the response to displacement were limited in 2014, despite increased recognition in recent years of the importance of doing so. Underfunding continued to hamper the implementation of early recovery programmes.

In Zamboanga, efforts by the international humanitarian community, including donors, focused mainly on the delivery of immediate relief and transitional shelter solutions. As of August, the UN’s action plan for the city was funded at 47 per cent, but the early recovery component had received no support at all. The humanitarian country team’s adoption of a durable solutions strategy for the city’s IDPs at the end of the year laid the foundation for continued international involvement in 2015, and raised hopes that increased attention would be paid to long-term solutions, particularly the right of the most vulnerable IDPs to adequate housing.

The strategic response plan for Myanmar for 2014 appealed for $192 million. One of its key strategic objectives was to restore livelihoods and access to basic services of all IDPs in Rakhine, Kachin and northern Shan states, and to link up initiatives with recovery and development efforts. As of the end of the year the overall appeal was 58 per cent funded, but the early recovery component at only 22 per cent.

Building on initiatives taken in recent years to improve national and regional capacity for disaster risk management, members of ASEAN made commitments in 2014 to address displacement caused by disasters, including the adoption of policies and laws to strengthen IDPs’ assistance and protection.
THE PHILIPPINES

Housing challenges in urban areas

Children in the Cawa-Cawa displacement site, a camp that was situated on the sea shore near a traffic road. The Zamboanga authorities dismantled the camp in mid-2014, moving most IDPs to the Masepla transitional camp. Most Cawa-Cawa IDPs remain there as of today.

Photo: IDMC/ Frederik Kok, June 2014
Millions of people are displaced each year in the Philippines, mainly as a result of disasters brought on by natural hazards, but also as a result of conflict and violence. Displacement tends to be short-term and localised. IDPs seek refuge with host families or in government camps before returning home when conditions allow.

Return may not always be possible, however, either because of insecurity or the loss of housing and livelihoods. IDPs who try to integrate locally or settle elsewhere, including in urban areas, often face significant challenges because of lack of tenure security and insecure environments. National authorities’ lack of political will and engagement, particularly when IDPs belong to marginalised ethnic or religious minorities, is often behind such challenges.

The extent of protracted displacement is not known, but available data suggests that half of the 461,000 people displaced by conflict and disasters as of the end of 2014 had fled their homes more than a year before.287 This includes 31,000 IDPs in Zamboanga city on Mindanao, who have been living in displacement for 14 months.

In September 2013, three weeks of fighting between the government and a faction of the Moro National Liberation Front destroyed around 10,000 homes and led to the displacement of 120,000 people within the city.288 Most belonged to Muslim minority groups who had moved to Zamboanga over the past decades to escape conflict, insecurity and disasters.289

The majority of the city’s IDPs returned home in the weeks and months after the conflict, but many have been unable to do so. As of early 2015, around 20,000 were still living in camps, including transit sites to which many were forced to move during 2014, and 11,000 were living in host communities.290 Most camps and transit sites do not meet minimum standards in terms of shelter or access to food, water, sanitation and healthcare.291

The main obstacles to their return are government restrictions, including “no-build zones” declared in Muslim-majority coastal areas where many IDPs had their homes, and the slow pace of reconstruction. Fewer than 200 of the 7,800 permanent homes earmarked for reconstruction had been completed a year after the conflict ended.292

Tenure insecurity is also a major factor preventing the return of the remaining IDPs. The majority owned their homes, but not the land on which they were constructed.293 The government has prioritised landowners for return and housing assistance, leaving others to wait. Some have been promised return once reconstruction is complete or relocation outside the city, but most have no information on when this might happen.

The fact that eligibility criteria for housing assistance had not been formalised as of early 2015, and that new “temporary” transit sites were still being constructed, have added to the confusion and scepticism of many IDPs, who fear their temporary stay may become a permanent one.

Others are at risk of being completely excluded from assistance, because the government considers them “illegitimate” IDPs on the basis of a tenure survey which purported to reveal that many had come to Zamboanga after the conflict.294 Assessments by international aid agencies, however, showed the vast majority had been living there for more than five years.295

Despite its genuine efforts to help Zamboanga’s IDPs, the city government has so far failed to take adequate measures to ensure the most vulnerable, particularly those with poor tenure security, are provided with long-term recovery assistance. The absence of an early recovery strategy following the end of the humanitarian phase in August 2014 has left many at risk of entrenched poverty, vulnerability and protracted displacement.

Poor donor response to the Zamboanga action plan in 2014, particularly its early recovery component, and limited engagement from the development sector have seriously hampered the international community’s capacity to respond. The humanitarian country team adopted a durable solutions strategy in October 2014, raising hope that more attention will be paid to long-term solutions, particularly in terms of the most vulnerable IDPs’ right to adequate housing.
Injured man standing in his destroyed house, Palestine.
Photo: Emad Badwan, July 2014
There are IDPs who have been living in protracted displacement for more than ten years in almost 90 per cent of the countries we monitored in 2014. The majority made no visible progress during the year against the eight criteria set out in the IASC framework for durable solutions.

The failure to anchor IDPs’ return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in broader development and peace-building programmes was responsible for the majority of displacement lasting ten years or more. In one in five cases, governance failures by absent states were also a major factor.

People already displaced at least once by conflict and violence before 2014 were forced to flee their homes again during the year in a third of the countries we monitor. In more than 80 per cent of cases, further exposure to conflict or generalised violence in IDPs’ places of refuge was the cause. Others were driven to move again because they were unable to meet their immediate survival needs or access assistance to help them do so. Forced eviction and the impact of natural hazards such as floods and earthquakes, or the threat of them, were also factors.

Government restrictions on settlement options contributed to prolonging displacement in a fifth of cases monitored in 2014. In more than a third, no international or regional agency was actively involved in trying to resolve the situation. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs were still the main responders to another third of IDPs living in protracted displacement, but there was little involvement from development agencies and donor governments, and no private sector investment was visible at all.

The failure to address the causes of protracted displacement is the main factor behind the ever-increasing global figures on IDPs. Finding the right solutions requires a better understanding of the phenomenon, from clarifying key concepts to recognising its complexity and diversity.

There are many descriptive terms that allude mainly to the length of time spent in displacement – prolonged, chronic, extended, long-standing – and to the static nature of the situation – stalled, trapped and in limbo. Most descriptions emphasise a sense of intractability, a long-term separation from home and the absence of a solution in sight.

UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as those in which people have been displaced for five years or more and have no immediate prospect of finding a solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration or
settlement elsewhere. It also defines a protracted situation as one involving a refugee population of 25,000 or more, and focuses on the fact that their basic rights and economic, social and psychological needs remain unaddressed after years in exile. Taken as a whole, UNHCR’s definition includes elements of time, scale, barriers to solutions, unaddressed needs and aid dependency.

Two criteria are generally accepted as key features of protracted internal displacement: that the pursuit of durable solutions has stalled, and/or that IDPs are marginalised as a result of a failure to protect their human rights. This definition, however, also has its limitations. Under it, the vast majority of internal displacement could be deemed protracted. It could equally apply to situations involving ongoing or stalled conflict, and to displacement spanning a few months or years or several generations. It also treats the pursuit of durable solution as an on-or-off process when in reality it is far more complex. IDPs may secure small steps towards the achievement of one aspect of a durable solution, such as freedom of movement, while the process may be stalled in another respect such as the right to adequate housing.

There could be value in including an element of duration to the definition, for the purposes of statistical analysis. The problem with setting an arbitrary point beyond which displacement becomes protracted is that it groups IDPs into categories that may exclude them from relevant response frameworks and deprive them of the assistance to which they would otherwise be eligible and most likely need. Neither is it self-evident what an appropriate cut-off point would be.

In the absence of a more comprehensive definition, it is useful to draw on the experiences of those who have fled conflict around the world to highlight the complexity, diversity and dynamism of protracted displacement. Our monitoring points to a set of commonly-observed features that can help to identify, analyse and respond to the phenomenon.

**FEATURES AND DYNAMICS of protracted displacement worldwide**

**Politicisation and barriers to solutions**

There is a need to consider the links between protracted displacement and political crises, and to distinguish between governments’ inability and governments’ unwillingness to resolve it. State fragility and failure of governance – a typically “unable state” - commonly lead to intermittent conflict, inter-communal violence, endemic insecurity and poverty, and repeated population movements over years or decades. This applies to a number of countries around the world, from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar to the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia.

Displacement can also be prolonged by a strong government’s deliberate politicisation of the issue or its refusal to enter into the formal resolution of a crisis. A government may assert control over territory to the detriment of some segments of society, or try to marginalise minority groups it perceives as hostile. The excesses of authoritarian regimes and state-led repression also perpetuate displacement. Governments’ unwillingness to provide solutions often stems from the same logic that triggered displacement in the first place. That being the case, the end of conflict and violence is unlikely to be enough in itself to resolve IDPs’ plight.

Governments have the primary duty to establish the conditions for durable solutions and to provide the means of achieving them. In some cases, however, they prioritise return as the only option while obstructing IDPs’ efforts to integrate locally or settle elsewhere, as has been the case in Burundi, DRC and Sudan. In Azerbaijan, the government maintains return as the only permanent settlement option available, but negotiations to resolve the conflict and make that possible have been deadlocked for years. Such restrictions are a major factor in perpetuating displacement in 20 per cent of cases.

Governments may also prefer to re-locate IDPs to new areas rather than engage in peace-building and reconciliation processes. This too prolongs their displacement, as is the case for ethnic and religious minorities displaced by inter-communal violence in Indonesia. In Israel and occupied Palestine, return is for many simply not an option. Continued fear of persecution and uncertainty about the sustainability of peace agreements have prolonged displacement in a number of countries, including CAR, DRC, Kosovo and South Sudan.

**Multiple waves and patterns of displacement**

While the stagnation of displacement over time reflects a chronic failure of governance, repeated and multiple waves of displacement can also mirror the different stages of a political crisis. Many IDPs living in protracted displacement have been forced to flee a number of times over the years. Repeated cycles of displacement make IDPs’ circumstances, needs and vulnerabilities more complex and acute.

IDPs’ movements tend not to follow a simple, linear trajectory from places of residence to places of refuge. Complex patterns are frequently observed among and between displaced communities and households over time, and they take many forms. More than 80 per cent of IDPs forced to flee again in 2014 did so to escape further conflict or generalised violence in their places of refuge, as in CAR, DRC, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia,
Current data suggests that women living in protracted displacement slightly outnumber men, and given the difficulty in accessing female IDPs in many contexts it is likely that their number is underestimated.296

In Burundi and Colombia, data disaggregated by sex shows that women make up the majority of IDPs. Higher male mortality rates go part way to explaining the figures, but women and children also tend to flee first and remain displaced for longer. Men tend to stay longer in their areas of origin, either as fighters or to protect their family's property and assets. They also often return earlier to assess the situation and start to rebuild their homes and livelihoods.

It is generally acknowledged that female IDPs face specific barriers in exercising their rights, but there is little reliable disaggregated data on gender-specific needs and vulnerabilities in protracted displacement. Analysis shows, however, that displaced women's and girls' hardships get worse over time. They face a range of complex protection issues both in camps and outside them, and in many places affected by conflict and crisis they are extremely vulnerable. They suffer marginalisation and are often unable to make decisions freely about their lives and their communities. The stigma attached to gender-based violence, the consistent under-reporting of cases and inadequate service provision for those affected make it impossible to draw an accurate picture of its prevalence and dynamics.

Evidence from DRC suggests that as IDPs gradually exhaust their savings and assets and aid becomes scarcer, the likelihood of women resorting to survival sex and other negative coping mechanisms increases.297 Displaced women in Sri Lanka have reportedly resorted to sex in exchange for extended stays with host families.298 A survey carried out in emergency and transitory sites in Zamboanga city showed that prolonged displacement tended to intensify frustrations and tensions within communities and families, leading to an increase in domestic, psychological and sexual violence.299 In Cote d’Ivoire, women who had become the family breadwinner during three or four years in displacement found that their new roles were a source of tension, hostility and gender-based violence when they returned to their homes in the west of the country.300

Gender-based violence has serious consequences for economic, human and social development, and the trauma caused only adds to women’s fear of stigmatisation and marginalisation. Coupled with impunity for perpetrators, it compromises their prospects of achieving durable solutions. In northern Mali, the fact that alleged perpetrators of sexual violence in 2013 are still at large and unpunished has made female IDPs wary of returning and undermined their confidence that the state will facilitate conditions for them to bring their displacement to a sustainable end.301

Tenure insecurity is also a major obstacle to durable solutions, and a particular challenge for female IDPs.302 Women’s housing, land and property (HLP) rights are all too often violated not only by parties to a conflict, but also by their own families and communities. Despite national laws to protect them, displaced women are often unable to assert their HLP rights when they return to their places of origin, either because they do not have official documents in their name, or because inheritance, marital property and dispute resolution mechanisms are handled by customary or religious authorities that favour men.

In occupied Palestine, sharia law and the broader legal system do not officially prevent women from owning or leasing property, but cultural norms dictate that it is men who are named on tenure and ownership documents.303 Similar norms apply in Liberia, where family members have sold women’s land and property, occupied it with impunity or allocated it to male heads of households in their absence.304

Given that HLP rights are closely linked to other elements of durable solutions such as access to livelihoods, safety, security and an adequate standard of living, failure to uphold them constitutes a serious impediment to women’s prospects for return, local integration or settlement elsewhere.

Access to justice and remedies for displaced women who suffer gender-based human rights abuses is also key to their achievement of durable solutions. Conflict and violence can have devastating consequences for women, but experience shows that opportunities also arise to promote equality during recovery, when lives are rebuilt. Progressive initiatives that work towards ending discrimination and support women in reasserting their rights following a crisis should be further explored.305

There is an imperative to collect and analyse gender-specific data at the country level during all stages of displacement to inform humanitarian and development programmes that create a protective environment for women. Without such data, the prospects of establishing a comprehensive, rights-based framework for response from the onset of a crisis through to longer-term development planning for durable solutions are greatly compromised.
Syria and Yemen. Others were driven to move again because they were unable to meet their immediate survival needs or access assistance to help them do so. Forced eviction and the threat or impact of natural hazards such as floods and earthquakes were also key factors.

Many IDPs living in protracted displacement have been forced to flee a number of times over the years.

IDPs use their freedom of movement to minimise the risks they face, and to maximise their access to rights, goods and opportunities, both to overcome current challenges and to progress towards their preferred and sustainable settlement option. Some forms of movement commonly observed include:

- **Pendular or cyclical movements between places of refuge and origin**: Changes in the security situation in IDPs’ places of origin may allow for periodic visits home while risks and obstacles to more permanent return remain. Some IDPs in Senegal, DRC and occupied Palestine, many of them from farming communities, choose to take refuge near their land and revisit it regularly in an attempt to continue to farm. Some have been doing so for more than a decade.

- **Secondary, repeated or onward movements**: Conflict or other drivers force IDPs to flee from or within their places of refuge before long-term recovery and local integration are complete, contributing to spiralling vulnerability. Displaced families and individuals also employ a range of mobility strategies to provide for their immediate and longer term needs as different options become available to them. Voluntary movement or relocation may be positive strategies to improve their living conditions or access employment and services.

- **Changing composition over time**: The demographic composition of displaced populations changes over the years and decades. New waves of IDPs join those previously displaced, many blend in with others displaced for different reasons and migrants in search of better opportunities. Displaced children grow up, elderly IDPs die and new generations are born into displacement.

**Increasing neglect**

Many IDPs living in protracted displacement find that international attention declines over time, leaving them neglected by donors, the media and regional and international responders. Some, such as those in India and Bangladesh, never received much attention in the first place. As displacement continues, funding decreases, international organisations leave the country and assistance tails off, as does the attention of national authorities to their plight.

The priorities of governments and international organisations may also switch to focus on new displaced communities, as was the case in Chad and Pakistan in 2014. Such decisions may be understandable in countries with only limited resources, but neglected IDPs living in protracted displacement may even find themselves excluded from government statistics and policy documents altogether.
Displacement leads to a loss of assets, jobs, income and documentation. It disrupts social networks and sometimes restricts freedom of movement and choice of residence, all key to rebuilding and maintaining livelihoods. In countries recovering from conflict with fragile economies, high unemployment and weak foreign investment, IDPs in protracted displacement are just one group among many who struggle to find work.

Competition can be fierce and IDPs may suffer discrimination or find their skills are not valued or in demand in their places of refuge. This is particularly true of those who flee from rural to urban areas. Towns and cities offer a range of new opportunities, but the transition from a lifestyle based on agriculture can mean acquiring whole new skillsets, as has been seen in Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan. In some countries, the social stigmatisation of IDPs can hinder their efforts to find work even decades into their displacement, as seen in Colombia and Georgia.

Limited access to resources can lead IDPs to make choices that prejudice their safety and protection. Families take their children out of school to seek additional sources of income, as has happened in Uganda, and women stray into unsafe areas in search of firewood, as has happened in the Darfur region of Sudan. Women may resort to survival sex, and families may move to informal settlements in areas prone to natural hazards to save on housing costs.

Some IDPs in DRC have risked their lives going back to their places of origin temporarily to access their land. In Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kosovo and Serbia, some have taken work in the informal labour market while others have incurred new debt. Many in Somalia depend on the sale of firewood, petty trade, day labour, domestic work and begging, but the meagre income they earn often fails to cover their basic needs. Without adequate livelihoods, IDPs live from hand to mouth, which is not conducive either to their exercising their rights or to their achievement of durable solutions.

The proportion of vulnerable IDPs tends to increase over time as they are often the least able to become self-reliant. People living with trauma, elderly people and those with mental or physical disabilities may not be able to engage in livelihood activities or have access to the right type of assistance. They are at particular risk if they are separated from their relatives.

The lack of livelihood opportunities in IDPs’ places of origin is a serious obstacle to return and the pursuit of durable solutions. In rural areas of Burundi, DRC, Kosovo and Uganda, where access to land is largely synonymous with access to livelihoods, their inability to repossess land and property that has been occupied or destroyed makes return impossible and prolongs their displacement. Land restitution is made more difficult still if the occupants are powerful local figures, private companies, criminal groups or military forces, the latter being the case in Sri Lanka. In Colombia, violent opposition to land restitution led to new waves of displacement in 2014. In the Philippines, some IDPs’ places of origin were declared “no return” areas, but the site offered for their relocation made it highly unlikely they would be able to continue practicing their traditional livelihoods.

Improving livelihood opportunities requires initiatives that target IDPs, are supported by an enabling policy environment and involve sustainable economic interventions if they are to have a lasting impact. A multi-sectoral livelihoods and market assessment is key to determining appropriate assistance that takes IDPs’ skills and wishes into account, meets their immediate needs and helps to bolster their self-reliance. It may include cash assistance, food and housing support, and access to microcredit, income-generating activities and vocational training. Projects further tailored to address the specific needs of the most vulnerable are also important. They should include psychosocial support that encourages personal recovery and self-reliance. Initiatives should mix short and long-term approaches across sectors and focus on IDPs’ interests and potential to adapt.
Changing needs and vulnerabilities over time

As attention and assistance decrease, solutions to displacement become more elusive. The number of IDPs may fall over time, but our analysis suggests that their problems can become harder to resolve as the pursuit of durable solutions becomes more complex. Land grabs and the state occupation or acquisitions of land, for example, make it difficult for IDPs to reclaim their property after many years of absence. The issue has become a source of serious grievance in Burundi, DRC and Sri Lanka.

Many IDPs living in protracted displacement find that international attention declines over time

The needs of IDPs in protracted displacement may no longer be urgent, but they can be just as acute as in the emergency phase. In many cases, their vulnerabilities actually increase and their living conditions deteriorate over time, the result of less humanitarian attention and assistance, the exhaustion of coping strategies and a lack of justice for the violations they have suffered. The psychological impact of displacement is often neglected and responses are underfunded, leaving mental health issues associated with trauma to get worse.

Other dominant concerns include inadequate housing, limited access to land and employment opportunities and a lack of good-quality education. Women, children and elderly and disabled people are at particular risk of further marginalisation and impoverishment. Assessments in Uganda found that the majority of IDPs still living in camps would be unable to return under their own steam because of old age, illness and disability.

Different intentions and preferences

IDPs should not be considered as a homogenous group. They have different preferences based on their personal experiences and circumstances, and these may change over time and vary even within a single family. In Georgia, some family members have chosen to go abroad, some to return and others to stay in their places of refuge. Some IDPs in Uganda have split their lives, using their original land for shelter and cultivation while maintaining businesses in their places of refuge. Around a third of IDPs in Burundi work their original land while continuing to live in displacement.

The needs of IDPs in protracted displacement may no longer be urgent, but they can be just as acute as in the emergency phase

In Serbia, older IDPs would prefer to return if they could remain under Belgrade’s jurisdiction, while younger ones are not interested in doing so unless livelihood opportunities are made available. Among ethnic groups, Roma IDPs are less interested in return than their Serb counterparts. Indigenous IDPs in Colombia, whose attachment to their original land is of vital importance, have returned only to be displaced again several times, but still continue to try. IOM assessments in Iraq show that the longer families are displaced, the less likely they are to show any interest in returning.
Invisibility in urban areas

For many IDPs, displacement also marks the beginning of a transition from a rural to an urban way of life. In 2014, IDPs were living predominantly in urban settings in 16 of the 60 countries we monitored. There is little information on the situation of urban IDPs living in protracted displacement, but evidence from Afghanistan and Turkey suggests they increasingly seek to integrate locally rather than return, even if doing so involves significant marginalisation. Urban IDPs are often invisible to the international community among the broader urban poor, and they receive little or no assistance, which tends to go to more visible beneficiaries.

URBAN HOUSING

A shortage of housing stock is a problem in many rapidly expanding cities, and a particular challenge for urban IDPs living in protracted displacement. An influx of IDPs increases demand for housing at a time when conflict or a disaster may have damaged or destroyed stock and authorities lack the capacity to respond. Many urban IDPs join the broader urban poor in informal settlements with no access to basic services and little if any tenure security, exposing themselves to the risk of forced eviction and secondary displacement.

Inadequate housing perpetuates displacement by leaving urban IDPs in crowded and precarious slum-like conditions, increasing their vulnerability to disasters, disease and sexual exploitation, and limiting their capacity to gradually become self-reliant. Their housing situation tends to deteriorate over time as they deplete their assets. In Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, temporary housing provided some 25 years ago at the onset of the displacement crisis has become dilapidated and overcrowded despite investments over the years. Displaced children have grown up, married and had families of their own, but still live in the same facilities because they are unable to afford their own homes. Acknowledging this, national authorities in these countries have recently embarked on major housing improvement programmes for IDPs.

IDPs who try to settle in areas prone to natural hazards, without permission or without respecting building regulations, expose themselves to the risk of secondary displacement. This was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2014, when IDPs and returnees who had fled conflict in the 1990s were displaced again by floods and landslides, having built their homes without permission on public land that was at risk of flooding.

 Forced evictions not only create new displacement but also tend to lead to a deterioration in IDPs’ living and housing conditions. Even when alternative housing is provided, for example in relocation sites, there is a risk that the site will not offer adequate livelihood opportunities, as has proved the case in Indonesia, the Philippines and Somalia.

Inadequate housing conditions in protracted displacement often reflect the inability of national authorities to respond, but sometimes their unwillingness. There may be political interests that would prefer IDPs to return rather than integrate locally. In other cases, inadequate policies designed without taking IDPs’ needs and preferences into account may be at fault.

Urban settings create specific challenges for humanitarian organisations in trying to address housing needs. IDPs tend to be dispersed and largely invisible among the wider poor and there is often little or no urban planning. The lack of clear land registries and regulatory frameworks makes tenure, potential land use and the provision of utilities uncertain.

In part because of such complications, housing assistance tends to be limited to the provision of emergency or temporary shelter. Many providers recognise that those without tenure are often the most vulnerable and in need of assistance with longer-term solutions, but they may choose not to intervene because the risk that tenure will be disputed and beneficiaries subjected to eviction is considered too high. This contributes to perpetuating urban displacement and IDPs’ inadequate housing conditions.

To overcome these challenges, close cooperation between national authorities, their municipal counterparts, humanitarian organisations and the development sector is needed to ensure that urban IDPs’ housing needs are addressed as part of broader urban development policies. Area-based approaches that meet the needs of all of the urban poor in a given neighbourhood, including shelter, tenure security, services and livelihood opportunities, are key.

POLICY ADVANCES

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement states in a recent report that protection was the most important humanitarian policy advance of the last decade, but the priority for the next one will be to address the protracted nature of displacement. To do so means bridging “the much-lamented relief-to-development gap” by finding effective ways of engaging the development sector in the pursuit of durable solutions.

There have been many efforts in this direction over the last five years. Various global initiatives have recognised the need to create a comprehensive framework for long-term integrated responses to protracted displacement. Building on the work of the Transitional Solutions Initiative, the Solutions Alliance was launched at the April 2014 Copenhagen conference on displacement with the aim of finding innovative approaches and development-led solutions. The initiative is global in scope, but examines the
situation in individual countries closely. The alliance aims to work on the one hand with donors, UN agencies, NGOs and governments, and on the other with affected communities in an effort to improve coherence among all participants’ efforts.

The importance of establishing a post-2015 development framework that includes IDPs and builds on their capacities to ensure they are fully included in peaceful and stable societies has also gained traction among global policymakers. No consensus was reached in 2014 on a standalone target for IDPs and refugees in the new sustainable development goals, but progress was made in formulating indicators specific to displacement as part of related goals and targets. The indicators recognise displacement as a key development challenge. They emphasise the need to improve the resilience of vulnerable people, including IDPs, and reduce the risks and impacts of future shocks such as conflict and disasters.

2014 also brought about positive developments at the national level. Following the adoption of the UN secretary general’s framework on durable solutions in 2012, an ad hoc working group under the leadership of UNHCR, UNDP and the resident coordinator drafted a joint durable solutions strategy in Kyrgyzstan that was endorsed by the UN country team in August 2014. A group of UN and government agencies developed a similar strategy in Côte d’Ivoire, which remains in draft form. Similar national and subnational durable solutions strategies were developed in Mali, Zamboanga city in the Philippines and Kachin state in Myanmar. As of the end of 2014, however, only 40 per cent of the countries we monitor had adopted specific national laws or strategies on displacement.

Advances such as those above are clearly welcome, but there is still much to be done to implement these initiatives and make concrete progress towards durable solutions. In more than a third of protracted displacement situations monitored throughout the year, no international or regional agency was actively involved in trying to resolve the situation.

The transition from humanitarian response to long-term development is far from seamless. Once a conflict is over, the expectation is that the development sector will take the lead in addressing IDPs’ needs. In reality, however, the gap between relief and development continues to be hard to bridge. Aggravating factors include different operational mandates and timeframes for engagement and results, a shortage of coordination mechanisms, diminishing investment, competition for funding and failure to incorporate IDPs’ needs into recovery and development plans.

The very existence of protracted displacement is evidence that approaches to durable solutions have largely failed. Displacement becomes protracted when conflicts remain unresolved and reconciliation processes stall, mainly as a consequence of governments’ inability or unwillingness to assume their national responsibilities. Ultimately, political action is needed. With no clear signals from the highest levels of government, it is unlikely that effective measures will be taken to establish the necessary conditions to resolve protracted displacement.

**IDP VOICES**

**Papua New Guinea**

**Pikas Kapi**
Bulolo care centre,
Bulolo town, Morobe province
9 October 2014

We are the fifth generation of East Sepik settlers. Our ancestors came to Bulolo town in the 1940s, to work in the gold mine and never left. Myself, I am married to a woman from Morobe province. We have been in this care centre for almost four years, living in broken tents and with no one helping us.

Life is very difficult, particularly for our children. Many are still traumatised by the fighting and don’t want to go back to school. They want to stay with us in the camp, but what kind of education can we give them here? Many get ill because they don’t get enough to eat. Water is also not good. We have to hope for rain if we want to drink.

Fortunately some of us can still access our farmland so we don’t die from hunger, but it is barely enough to survive. The government doesn’t care about us and would prefer us all to leave this place, but it’s our home.

In 2011, the government encouraged us to ‘repatriate’ to East Sepik, but this would not work. We no longer have any links there, no land and no way to make a living. Some accepted the money from the government to go back, but almost all returned here after a few weeks.

We hope the government will now provide funds to help us return and rebuild our homes, so we can live like normal people again.

We feel abandoned.
National and international frameworks on displacement are key entry points for addressing its protracted form. They require states to prevent and mitigate long-term impacts, reinforce the idea of IDPs as rights holders and identify national authorities as primary duty bearers. They also provide guidance and establish accountability for both humanitarian and development organisations that should, in theory at least, ensure a smooth transition between the different phases of a response.

Given that displacement increases the risk of gradual and long-term impoverishment by depriving IDPs of their livelihoods and the means of re-establishing them, the involvement of the development sector in drafting frameworks and the acknowledgement of its role in their implementation should help to prevent displacement from becoming protracted.308

The Kampala Convention is a champion in this respect in that it provides for a multi-pronged approach involving the state and other actors, including development agencies. The need to address the increasing vulnerabilities and progressive impoverishment caused by protracted displacement and eliminate the factors that contribute to it is spelled out in article 3(1) (k), which establishes the need to promote “self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods amongst IDPs” and implies the adoption of specific action to strengthen their resilience. Article 11 obliges states to bring displacement to an end, putting the emphasis on “promoting and creating satisfactory conditions”, which means restoring access to basic entitlements, including economic, social and HLP rights and creating long-term livelihood opportunities.309

At the national level, Somalia’s policy framework on displacement adopted in 2014 is to date the only instrument that explicitly mentions protracted displacement. It calls on authorities to “gradually upgrade living conditions of internally displaced and other displacement-affected communities in situations of protracted displacement and pending a durable solution in order to avoid a manifestation of a dependency syndrome and chronic poverty”. The policy also recommends interventions focused on improving existing services, increasing access to shelter, guaranteeing HLP rights, creating livelihood opportunities and protecting IDPs from forced displacement to unsafe areas.

Durable solutions are often neglected in normative tools to accommodate other priorities in the emergency phase, but the monitoring of their implementation helps to identify gaps and suggest changes that reflect needs and vulnerabilities that emerge during protracted displacement. This was the case in Georgia, where the 1996 law on IDPs was complemented by new legislation adopted in 2014 that sets out the conditions for dignified and safe return and supports improved living conditions and local integration.

A number of other countries sought to prevent and address protracted displacement through the development of national durable solutions strategies in 2014. Côte d’Ivoire’s draft, which was developed as part of its piloting of the UN Secretary General’s Decision on Ending Displacement in the Aftermath of Conflict, recommends measures to address problems linked to the lack of arable land, employment and livelihood opportunities, factors that both trigger and perpetuate displacement. Its other goals include reducing poverty, revitalising local economies, restoring basic social services and socio-economic reintegration. As of the end of 2014, the country’s planning ministry was leading a follow-up committee tasked with finalising the strategy and ensuring its alignment with the national development plan.

Similar attempts to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development responses were made in Mali. Anticipating waves of return to the north and possible protracted displacement in the south, a durable solutions working group that brought together UNHCR, UNDP and IOM established a framework for collaboration between responders at the beginning of the year. It helped to clarify the terms of humanitarian and development engagement by assigning to UNDP and UNHCR, the respective leads of the early recovery and protection clusters, the leadership role in the development of the strategy.

The adoption of policies and other normative tools is a significant expression of national responsibility and signals authorities’ intention to address displacement. Such tools are also needed to frame a comprehensive and collaborative approach to ensure that all those involved in the response are engaged from the outset. To be effective in preventing displacement from becoming protracted and addressing IDPs’ needs, they need to assign responsibilities to all responders, including development agencies, and ensure that such responsibilities are translated into principled action in areas relevant to human rights.
IDMC bases its monitoring on the review of others’ primary and secondary data. This chapter describes the data we obtain and how we analyse it. It includes a discussion of the methodologies our partners - which include governments, international humanitarian and development organisations, NGOs and research institutes - use to collect data, and the applicability and limitations of their approaches. It also highlights data gaps, how we address them and other challenges inherent in estimating new and cumulative displacement figures.

One of the main challenges in estimating the scale of displacement is the lack of an accepted definition of an IDP at the operational and data collection level. Distinguishing IDPs from other vulnerable groups and “populations of concern” and determining when they have achieved durable solutions tends to be a context-specific decision taken by national or local authorities and humanitarians working in the field.

During the early phases of a crisis, data tends to be collected by international humanitarian organisations and government agencies as they take stock of the situation and compile IASC’s humanitarian profile (see figure 4.1). Two people in two different places may have the same needs, but one of them may have been counted as an IDP while the other is not. A person may be considered an IDP one day but not the next, despite their situation not having changed, as has been the case in Sri Lanka.

Collecting and reporting data on IDPs is primarily the responsibility of the state, but very few governments do so. Even when they do, it is rarely if ever possible to base estimates entirely on their statistics. The extent to which displacement is a political issue or even acknowledged varies from country to country and sometimes within a country, meaning careful scrutiny is required.

With very few exceptions, comprehensive data does not exist. It may be available for some but not all areas of a country, or it may be collected for some but not all of the factors that determine an overall caseload. Such factors include the number of IDPs who have returned, integrated locally or settled elsewhere, and the number of those born or who have died in displacement. Our analysis and figures are constrained by the limited amount and scope of information collected and made available by others.

The fact that there is no widely used model to capture the number of people displaced or to track them beyond their
With very few exceptions, comprehensive data does not exist

The extended review of methodological limitations that follows was undertaken with an eye to contributing to a growing awareness across the humanitarian community of the need for better quality data and analysis on IDPs, and to taking the lead in filling these gaps. In the coming months and years, we will be working with partners to provide guidance on how to collect this information in order to overcome the challenges discussed.

Minimum data requirements for monitoring internal displacement

To paint a comprehensive picture of internal displacement, data on key groups of people – stocks - and their movement from one category to another – flows – is needed (see figure 4.2). Data on different population groups would indicate how many people there were in each category at a given moment in time, and data on different movements would indicate how – and how quickly – people were moving from one category to another. At present, however, stakeholders have no data model with which to comprehensively capture such information.
In keeping with the literature on measuring population movements, this section of the Global Overview makes regular use of the terms “stocks” and “flows”, but we would like to emphasise that behind these abstract and impersonal terms are real human beings.

Not all stocks and flows are relevant to each displacement situation. In some contexts return is not a viable option. In others, settlement elsewhere is not realistic. When borders are closed, people trying to flee may become trapped in their own country. When displacement becomes protracted, the relevance of the different stocks and flows may change over time. Years or decades after an initial crisis, flows such as births and deaths become more important in determining the number of IDPs.

It is very rare that we and our partners have all the data on the different stocks and flows for a particular displacement event. Estimates based on needs assessments exclude IDPs who do not require assistance, or at least not at that moment in time. Those dispersed outside camps tend not to be covered. As such the portrait of displacement we present – of a given moment in time and how the situation is evolving – is usually incomplete.

In some parts of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), our partners provide us with monthly data on the number of IDPs in certain villages. The data tells us how many there might be at certain points in time, but not how many new IDPs have arrived or how many have left. If there are 100 IDPs in a village two months in a row, the situation may be unchanged, or it may be that 20 have arrived and 20 have left.
MEASURING STOCKS

There are many different tools and methods to gauge the numbers of IDPs and other populations of concern. Several are likely to be used for any one displacement situation, and often simultaneously.

Counting new IDPs

In many crises, the registration and deregistration of IDPs determines the distribution of assistance and compensation. The potential for receiving benefits is the main reason for many to come forward, but doing so may also lead to protection risks. Personal data may be misused and the process may associate IDPs with a particular party to a conflict with the potential for reprisals. It may also exclude some IDPs, making them ineligible for assistance. Data may be out-dated if databases are not properly maintained.

As such, compiling estimates from registration and deregistration processes is difficult. The nature of the data depends on who is running the scheme, who comes forward and what their motives are for doing so. In Ukraine, registered IDPs receive benefits for six months, a fact that may influence people’s decision to sign up.

Deregistration does not necessarily mean that IDPs have achieved a durable solution

The methodology for registration may also vary. IDPs may be required to present identification and other documents, meet specific criteria or re-register periodically to receive assistance. Many, however, lose their personal documents during their flight, and security concerns may make others reluctant to present them.

Deregistration, meantime, does not necessarily mean that IDPs have achieved a durable solution. Authorities may deregister them, or they may do so for themselves while they still have needs related to their displacement. That said, registration and deregistration are not inherently problematic. Rather the problem lies in how the tools are used, and how they influence incentives by conferring benefits according to people’s responses.

In the early phases of many crises, data on IDPs is collected as part of compiling a humanitarian profile. It is sometimes disaggregated by sex and age, which helps to understand the specific protection risks IDPs face and tailor programmes accordingly. As with registration and deregistration data, that collected for humanitarian needs assessments is also subject to manipulation - or at least the perception it has been manipulated - for fundraising purposes or to shape the media’s portrayal of a crisis. Putative beneficiaries may be led to believe they will be compensated for responding to questions in a certain way. The prospect of receiving benefits may spur those genuinely in need to come forward for assessment, but it may also encourage others who in reality are not eligible to do so too.

Accounting for longer-term displacement

IOM’s displacement tracking matrix is used regularly to gather baseline information on displaced populations, including their number, demographics, needs and conditions in their places of refuge. It can also be used to monitor movements such as returns and secondary displacement. Since its introduction in Iraq in 2006, the matrix has been used in more than 24 countries, including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Haiti, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, the Philippines and South Sudan. We used its data as a primary source of data in three countries - Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali - and OCHA and UNHCR may have used it in their initial aggregation before they shared their data with us.

Many IDPs living in protracted displacement have been displaced long enough to be included in official government censuses. The difficulty with censuses, however, is that they are inherently political instruments and again data can be manipulated. Changes in governance structures between censuses can also skew their findings. The devolution of authority and budgets to Kenya’s county governments changed incentives between the country’s 1999 and 2009 censuses, and produced new county population figures not be easily explained by demographic data such as birth and death rates.

In 2014, information on all three settlement options was available in only four countries.

A complete picture of displacement would include the number of people who have returned, settled elsewhere, integrated locally or crossed an international border. With the exception of those who have returned to their places of origin, however, there is very little data to determine the extent to which IDPs have achieved durable solutions. Only seven of the 60 countries we cover had data available on local integration and only six on settlement elsewhere. Information on all three options for durable solutions was available in only four countries - Armenia, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Sri Lanka – and only Lebanon had data on Syrian IDPs who had become refugees.

New technologies

Given insecurity and lack of access to IDPs in Somalia’s Afgooye corridor, UNHCR has updated its figures by analysing high-resolution satellite imagery. It used the images to determine that there were 91,397 temporary shelters and 15,495 permanent ones, and used the findings to estimate that there were more than 400,000 IDPs in the area. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, has also become increasingly popular in the humanitarian sector. Their size and cost have come down and they have become easier to use.
Ideally, data from such sources would be verified by organisations on the ground, and without doing so it should be used with caution. Imagery from satellites is also more useful in some places than others, in that cloud cover and dense forests may prevent them from capturing images of shelters. It is also a relatively expensive way of trying to count IDPs.

Challenges in estimating stocks
We regularly receive data on flows of newly displaced people which, during the initial stages of a humanitarian crisis, determine the stock of IDPs. As a crisis evolves over time, however, other flows such as returns become relevant and if no data on them is available we risk overstating the number of IDPs.

Given that humanitarian agencies collect data to inform their assistance efforts during a crisis, we generally find that the more time passes after the initial phase, the less data on such flows is available. If there are no humanitarian agencies present or if governments lack the political will to address displacement, there tends to be even less monitoring beyond the emergency phase, as in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

There are also a series of issues related to coordination and consistency to bear in mind. Humanitarian and other organisations do not always have access to displaced populations, whether because of insecurity, lack of transport infrastructure, high logistical costs or government restrictions. Estimating the number of IDPs and reporting their assistance and protection needs is a major challenge in such situations.

The contrary is also true. When a number of organisations are involved on the ground, each collecting and producing their own statistics with little or no coordination, estimates are equally difficult to compile. The areas that humanitarian organisations operate in are also determined by their own geographical priorities, funding and operating criteria.

There are few standards and little guidance for collecting data on IDPs in the field. An IASC survey found that information management staff in country offices and across organisations knew they were required to collect data, but were unsure how to go about the task. This can lead to double or even triple counting, in which one IDP is surveyed various times as a beneficiary of a number of interventions.

Without a common operational definition of internal displacement and its translation into many languages, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish consistently between IDPs and other vulnerable groups such as the urban poor, economic migrants, returned refugees, returned IDPs and so-called ‘pastoralist drop-outs’. Decisions by responders to engage in a situation and then collect data about it depend upon the perceived cause of the crisis and the categorisation of the people affected. This in turn leads to inconsistent engagement and data collection.

Unsystematic data collection makes it difficult to compare different displacement situations, even within a country. In Syria, for example, different methods are used in different areas depending on which party to the conflict controls the territory at the time. Humanitarians in different areas are accused of being partial and manipulating their data for political purposes.

IDP VOICES

Afghanistan

Wali Khan
Kart-e-Naw
NRC Afghanistan, 2 February 2015

I first left my hometown of Zhari in Kandahar 14 years ago because of the intense fighting, but also because of tensions with the landowners. I moved my family to Quetta in Pakistan, where we lived for ten years. We heard there were opportunities for work in Afghanistan so I returned to my village, but I only stayed for three or four months.

The Taliban would enter people’s homes and shoot rockets at the Americans’ planes. Then the Americans would return fire and drop bombs on us. A bomb was dropped on our house, killing my wife, her sister-in-law and my sister. I thought I would be able to endure the pain and move on with my life, but it was never-ending.

My brother and his son went to collect oil when the Taliban attacked one of the tankers, killing them and dozens of other poor people. After that, I decided I had had enough and moved my family to Kabul. I’ve been in this settlement for four years now. I have three wives and 15 children.

We bury so many babies who die from the cold, I’ve lost count. Maybe around 20 every winter. The children have constant diarrhoea from the dirty water. When we have money we buy water from the water tanks. Our women have no skills, they don’t even know how to sew. The men are all unemployed. They occasionally do odd jobs such as helping truck drivers load or unload goods.

We feel hopeless.
Data quality

As described in chapter one, data disaggregated by age and sex was only available for 15 of the 60 countries we provide estimates for, and even when available it was not comprehensive. As such it is still difficult to assess the protection risks of vulnerable groups such as women, children and elderly people accurately. Disaggregated data is often collected during the monitoring and assessment of health and education programmes that provide benefits to IDPs. If assisting IDPs is incidental rather than central to such initiatives, then those trying to collect disaggregated data may not be aware of it.

Accounting for IDPs not living in collective centres, camps or camp-like settings is also a significant challenge, given that humanitarian profile data tends not to cover them. Those dispersed in urban areas are particularly hard to identify, and all the more so in the early phase of a crisis. We estimate that only a small fraction of all IDPs live in camps, collective centres and camp-like settings, meaning the vast majority are not captured and the scale of displacement is significantly understated. The gap is concerning because we often use humanitarian profile data to compile our figures. It forms the basis for 18 of our 60 country estimates and around 63 per cent of all the displacement we report on annually.

Large humanitarian crises and highly visible emergencies prompt data-gathering efforts as part of the humanitarian response. Crises that are smaller or less visible tend to be under-reported, either because of their location or their nature. Displacement associated with criminal violence in Central America is one such example. Less data is gathered, making it more difficult to analyse.

Producing a single national estimate usually involves aggregating displacement from various regions within a country, or from multiple displacement situations within a region. Combining various figures in this way, however, makes it impossible to determine how long a given individual or group has been displaced. The time series data for displacement in Iraq illustrates this point (see figure 4.3). Prior to the US-led invasion in 2003, there were an estimated 700,000 to a million IDPs in the country. By 2008, the figure had risen to 2.8 million, but it does not tell us how many of those displaced before the invasion were included in the total figure.

It is difficult to assess the protection risks of vulnerable groups

Differentiating IDPs from the population at large can also be difficult. In principle, it is possible to determine if IDPs have achieved a durable solution by establishing whether or not they still have vulnerabilities or face discrimination related to their displacement. Some vulnerabilities, such as their access to identity documents and their ability to exercise their political rights, are relatively easy to assess. Others, however, such as their ability to meet their basic necessities of life, are...
more complicated, particularly when their needs are no longer different from those of the general population or others affected by a crisis. In order to make meaningful, empirically derived assessments, data is needed on both the displaced and the broader population, and profiling is one way of obtaining it (see box on page 80).

**IDPs dispersed in urban areas are particularly hard to identify**

**Politics of displacement figures**

Displacement figures are often politically sensitive. The number of IDPs is widely used as a proxy for the scale of a crisis, and different stakeholders may try to use them to exaggerate or downplay a situation. Governments in particular may try to influence how a crisis is perceived by refusing to recognise IDPs as such, rather than as “beneficiaries”, “people affect-
ed”, “people who have left their homes” or even “migrants” and “refugees.” In the Philippines, some IDPs were designated as “illegitimate” or “fake” in an effort to deny them assistance and the right to return.

Even the humanitarian profile data published by OCHA and UNHCR is the result of discussion and sometimes compromise between the UN and the government in question. A government may be a party to a conflict, meaning its forces inevitably cause displacement. The military will often notify humanitarian organisations about imminent operations for their own security, and so they can prepare local populations and respond to those who are forced to flee.

**Profiling internal displacement situations**

Profiling is a collaborative process of gathering and analysing information on IDPs and others affected by displacement in order to advocate on their behalf, facilitate their protection and assistance and ultimately help them achieve durable solutions. A profiling exercise provides a comprehensive picture of displacement, drawing on a wide range of information from disaggregated demographics to indicators about needs, capacities and coping mechanisms, their degree of local integration and their potential plans for return or settlement elsewhere. It entails:

- **Using mixed methods**: Profiling uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods at the household, individual and community level to provide information disaggregated by location, sex, age and diversity.
- **Comparative analysis**: Profiling aims to analyse the realities of the different communities and population groups living in a particular area. Comparative analysis helps policymakers and practitioners understand the similarities between groups in order to identify synergies in their programming, and the differences, such as specific needs related to displacement, to inform targeted responses.
- **In-depth understanding**: IDPs, like all migrants, have skills, experience and networks that can benefit their host families and communities, and if tapped into can form the basis for durable solutions. As well as assessing vulnerabilities, profiling sheds light on such assets for IDPs, host families and their non-displaced neighbours. By looking at IDPs’ aspirations, plans and criteria for decision-making, it can also inform a forward-looking response, even in volatile contexts.

- **Collaboration**: Profiling is more than the data it produces. It is a sequence of interlinked steps beginning with consensus building around the need for the exercise, and ending with the validation of findings by the profilers and the target populations themselves, and the dissemination of results. It aims to be a transparent and ethical process, actively promoting the buy-in of local, national and international stakeholders. By bringing various partners together to work on a joint process, profiling helps to ensure that the data collected is broadly agreed upon and widely used. It reduces the need for a series of parallel assessment exercises, and helps to ensure that practitioners working in the same setting have a common understanding of it.
- **Capacity building**: As a process that is locally owned and implemented, profiling also helps to increase local capacity and strengthen collaborative working practices.

JIPS is an inter-agency body established in 2009 to support governments and the humanitarian and development sectors in planning and implementing collaborative profiling exercises. Its methodologies can be adapted to different displacement contexts, but JIPS has developed specialised expertise in profiling protracted and urban situations to inform planning and responses in pursuit of durable solutions.
Comprehensive data on flows is necessary in order to track people beyond their initial displacement, as they return, integrate locally, settle elsewhere, cross an international border or die. Flows show the rate at which IDPs move from one category to another, and as such indicate where attention might be focused to facilitate the achievement of durable solutions. They are also essential to understanding patterns of secondary and tertiary displacement.

**As displacement becomes protracted, it is increasingly necessary to account for births and deaths**

In an emerging or ongoing crisis, the flow of newly displaced people is often inferred from the number of IDPs or the difference between their stocks measured at two different points in time. New IDPs are those displaced between the onset of a crisis and the time at which humanitarians began counting them.

As displacement becomes more protracted, it is increasingly necessary to account for births and deaths. We and our partners do this by using demographic data to calculate changes in the size of the displaced population over time, particularly in situations that have remained stable over many years, such as Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that protracted displacement is becoming the norm, however, data on births and deaths was only available for 11 of our 60 country estimates – Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, CAR, Cyprus, DRC, Georgia, Lebanon, Mali, Palestine and Yemen.

Returns are one of the few flows for which data is collected, often by governments which report the number of IDPs who have gone back to their places of origin or habitual residence. Returns are the main factor in decreases in our cumulative estimates. We do not count people who have returned as IDPs, whether or not they have achieved a sustainable end to their displacement as defined by the eight criteria set out in the IASC framework for durable solutions.

Nearly all refugees begin their flight as IDPs. When they cross international borders, we and our partners subtract them from the number of IDPs in their country of origin. UNHCR introduced a population movement tracking system in Somalia in 2006 to measure new internal and cross-border displacements and returns on a monthly basis. IDPs who became refugees were accounted for in our estimates for CAR, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mali and Syria.

**Challenges in estimating flows**

Very little data is collected on people who integrate locally or settle elsewhere. The difficulties in distinguishing IDPs from the general population and in establishing a credible pre-displacement baseline from which to measure their conditions are factors. The fact that governments tend to prefer and encourage IDPs to return to their places of origin may also help to explain why so little data is gathered on the other options for durable solutions.

Return, local integration and settlement elsewhere involve more than just geographical location. They are about whether people have overcome their vulnerabilities linked to their displacement and are able to exercise their rights without discrimination. But at what point can vulnerability be said to have been overcome? Is it when IDPs have full access to all of their rights, when they have full access to certain core rights, when a percentage have access to all of their rights or when most are able to exercise their rights within a given range, for example as set out in IASC’s framework for durable solutions?

**We do not count people who have returned as IDPs, whether or not they have achieved a sustainable end to their displacement**

**Innovative ways to estimate flows**

In 2011, the Kenyan NGO Ushahidi began monitoring displacement in eastern DRC by drawing on local people, including IDPs, as a source of primary data. Its “crowd-sourcing” methodology encourages people to use their mobile phones and the internet to report incidents of displacement and relay information about IDPs’ living conditions. Initially piloted in early 2008 to track displacement related to post-election violence in Kenya, Ushahidi’s method of referencing incidents geospatially and crowd-mapping has directed assistance quickly to the places where it is most needed.

Crowd-sourced information gathering cannot be seen as a replacement for more comprehensive surveys, assessments and censuses. It is, however, a good complement because it relies on a different source and means of collecting data, and as more people have access to mobile phones, it is likely to become more widespread and useful. Drawing on Ushahidi’s cache of crowd-sourced incident reports, the next phase of development may be to include models that anticipate future displacement based on the analysis of events as they unfold.

Another approach, known as Flowminder, is based solely on “anonymised” mobile phone call and text message records, regardless of their content. It has been able to track displacement by comparing people’s usual patterns of movement with those during and after a crisis.
The primary reason for the paucity of data, however, is the lack of a demand for it. Once crises have been overcome to the point where IDPs are resettling and integrating in significant numbers, humanitarians begin to withdraw and cede to their counterparts in the development sector. The collection of data on displacement sometimes stops altogether once humanitarian organisations leave, in part because the emergency is deemed to be over, and in part because there is no real focus on understanding the longer term dynamics of displacement. Unless the development sector takes a greater interest in IDPs, there is little reason to believe the data gap will be addressed.

The collection of data on displacement sometimes stops altogether once humanitarian organisations leave.

The complexity of displacement dynamics is an issue too. Many IDPs are frequently on the move, and may return to their places of origin for short periods to check on their homes, property and other assets. Displaced farmers may undertake such pendular movements to tend or harvest their crops, and pastoralists may leave a displacement camp temporarily to find grazing for their livestock. Some displaced families may split up, intentionally or otherwise. Roma IDPs often undertake seasonal migration or live informally on private or government land, where they face the risk of eviction and forcible relocation. Lack of documentation such as ID cards and passports contributes to the difficulty in tracking such movements.

The sustainability of solutions is also a factor. Too often the conditions for returns, local integration or settlement elsewhere to be sustainable are not in place, leading to further displacement (shown as counter-flows in figure 4.2). If IDPs are poorly accounted for to begin with, tracking their secondary and tertiary displacement is a greater challenge still. They may be counted for the first time as “new IDPs” during what is in fact their second or third flight, adding to the difficulty in estimating the duration of displacement accurately.

We sometimes receive credible information from various sources, often without meta-data, resulting in a range of likely displacement figures. This is particularly challenging given that we have only limited access to the field and to figures that pre-date our existence.

Other challenges

When a number of organisations collect data, or figures are aggregated from separate sector or cluster reports, the likelihood of double counting increases. Pendular movements may also result in IDPs being counted more than once, or not at all, depending on how and when the data is collected. In displacement camps around Goma in eastern DRC, for example, large numbers of IDPs leave during the day to work and find food. If counting takes place during these periods, clearly the figures will underestimate the scale of displacement.

Some IDPs are displaced within very small geographical areas, those in the Gaza Strip being a case in point. In Syria too, more than 210,000 people are estimated to have been trapped in besieged areas. They may not, however, be consistently included in data gathering by different stakeholders because they are still in or very near their places of origin.

Many of the situations we monitor are dynamic, so figures risk misrepresenting what is really happening.

In stable displacement situations, annual nationally aggregated figures may be a reasonable reflection of the reality on the ground. Many of the situations we monitor, however, are dynamic, meaning such figures risk misrepresenting what is really happening. In the Philippines, large displacements have occurred and been resolved in a matter of a few weeks. If we were to collect and report on displacement solely on an annual basis without taking these flows into account it would seem as if they had never taken place.

As shown in the diagrams of displacement dynamics in section two, many inter-connected factors influence flows. Understanding how they relate to a given situation is important to the contextual analysis of the displacement figures we receive, indicating whether they are over or understated and why that may be the case.

Ideally, we would be able to produce high-quality real-time estimates for dynamic situations and unfolding crises, but there is usually a trade-off between producing real-time estimates and accurate information. Depending on their objectives and obligations, different stakeholders are comfortable with varying degrees of uncertainty.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of December 2014</th>
<th>New displacement in 2014</th>
<th>Returns in 2014</th>
<th>Comments on estimated total number of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neither the figure for Sudan nor South Sudan includes IDPs from the Abyei area as its final status remains undetermined. No new displacements were registered in 2014, but 20,000 people still displaced as a result of the 2011 conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>At least 805,400</td>
<td>At least 156,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is the number of IDPs profiled. It does not include all IDPs displaced by conflict in urban and semi-urban areas, nor those in inaccessible areas. Returns are not systematically monitored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Up to 8,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure draws on a 2004 NRC survey carried out in coordination with the government. No more recent figures are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Up to 568,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is partially based on a government figure published at the end of 2014 by the State Committee for Refugees and IDPs. It includes children born to male and single or widowed female IDPs. It excludes IDPs in Nagorno Karabakh, and 54,000 returned IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>At least 431,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*&quot;The figure is based on information published in 2006 and 2009. No updated data is available. No international agencies monitor displacement, returns, local integration or settlement elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>At least 100,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is the government figure from the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees. It includes people with &quot;displaced person&quot; status, including children born to IDPs. It is based on the 2005 country-wide re-registration of IDPs. It excludes returned IDPs, some Roma IDPs and those who have had their property restituted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Up to 77,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>At least 1,300 IDPs returned to their places of origin in 2014, bringing the overall figure down from 78,900, a 2011 figure determined by a profiling exercise conducted by the government, UN and NGOs. No displacements were reported in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>At least 40,000</td>
<td>At least 40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>The government estimated that insecurity had displaced 40,000 people in the Far North, North and East regions of the country as of December 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Up to 438,500</td>
<td>At least 172,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some IDPs are thought to have returned in 2014, while others sought refuge abroad. More than 172,000 new displacements were reported. IDPs living in the bush and with host families, and those occupying other's homes tend to be invisible, meaning their number could be very different than estimated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Up to 71,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The drop from 90,000 at the end of 2013 to 71,000 at the end of 2014 is the result of new data being available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* No information available
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6,044,200</td>
<td>Up to 7800</td>
<td>At least 5900</td>
<td>No information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The estimate represents the number of IDPs registered by the government between 1985 and 2014. No figures were available from the civil society organisation CODHES at the time of writing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2,756,600</td>
<td>At least 1,003,400</td>
<td>561,100</td>
<td>The estimate is the result of a profiling exercise conducted by the government and UNHCR in 2014, supported by technical support from IOM. The exercise focused on areas in the west of the country, and urban centres, and may have excluded some pockets of the population. Figures are approximate as access to informal settlements, host communities and the bush is difficult and movements are dynamic.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>IDPs who returned in 2014 are not included.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The figure is based on the civil population in camps that had resettled or returned by March 2008, but the UN and other sources suggest that 10,000 may still be living with host families and communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>397,200</td>
<td>At least 1,400</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>The estimate is based on the number of people relocated by UNHCR, including children who are returned to their home or to informal settlements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The estimate is inferred from the National Institute of Statistics Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey. No new results were available for 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>397,200</td>
<td>At least 1,400</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>The estimate is inferred from the National Institute of Statistics Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey. New displacements reported in news media.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>The estimate is inferred from the Civil Population Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey. No new results were available for 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The estimate is inferred from the Civil Population Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey. New displacements reported in news media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>24,8,500</td>
<td>At least 24,8,500</td>
<td>24,8,500</td>
<td>The estimate is inferred from the Civil Population Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The estimate is inferred from the Civil Population Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>At least 2,48,500</td>
<td>At least 2,48,500</td>
<td>24,8,500</td>
<td>The estimate is inferred from the Civil Population Permanent Multi-purpose Household Survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>At least 853,900</td>
<td>At least 345,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The figure is compiled from various sources, including media and NGO reports over the last 5 years, and only covers regions where data is available. There are no government or international agencies that monitor displacement comprehensively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>At least 84,000</td>
<td>At least 800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The figure is based on aggregated sources from government, UN and INGOs and only covers selected regions where data is available. The figure does not cover displacement in Papua and West Papua provinces as no credible data is available. Dates of the sources range from 2009 to 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>At least 3,276,000</td>
<td>At least 2,776,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The figure is based on UN estimates and data published by IOM and national and local authorities. Given the volatile security situation, the fluidity of population movements and access restrictions, the actual number of IDPs is difficult to track and figures are often revised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>309,200</td>
<td>At least 220,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The estimate does not include IDPs displaced by post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 who sought refuge with host communities, those forcibly evicted or those displaced by violence after January 2012. OCHA reported 220,200 new displacements in 2014 as a result of inter-communal clashes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>At least 17,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>The figure combines different data collection methods, sources and units of analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Up to 4,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The figure is based on figures published by Amnesty International in 2012. The authorities continue to limit independent international access, making it difficult to confirm the current number of IDPs, or to assess the extent to which they have been able to achieve durable solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>The figure is based on UNRWA's data for Palestinian refugees displaced from Nahr-el-Bared camp. It subtracts returns from the overall population displaced in 2007. Other instances of displacement in Lebanon are not included as they were temporary and data available is not reliable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The UNHCR estimate is for people still believed to be living in former displacement camps as of 2007. As most IDPs able to return had done so by 2011, the government considers displacement resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>At least 400,000</td>
<td>At least 340,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>This figure is based on UNHCR estimates as of December 2014. Comprehensive and precise data is hard to come by. International organisations left the country in July 2014 because of deteriorating security. Figures may include people displaced a number of times, which could have led to double counting.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>At least 200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>The figure represents those the government considers as IDPs as of July 2014. No more recent data is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>At least 61,600</td>
<td>At least 19,200</td>
<td>178,400</td>
<td>The government figure is based on assessments made in close collaboration with IOM using the displacement tracking matrix. The figure is approved by the population movements commission, which has been led by the government since November 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>At least 281,400</td>
<td>At least 9,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>The estimate covers people still displaced in Chiapas following the Zapatista uprising, people displaced by criminal and communal violence, and mass displacements in Sinaloa, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tamaulipas and Veracruz, which were not accounted for in the 2013 figure. Data come from civil society and academic sources. No official figures exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Up to 645,300</td>
<td>At least 6,200</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>The figures for Kachin, northern Shan and Rakhine are based on CCCM cluster assessments. The number for the south-east is based on the results of a November 2012 survey by the Border Consortium and has not significantly decreased since then.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Up to 50,000</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>The figure is based on a UNHCR estimate and represents the number of people displaced by the civil war and still unable to return. No new data has been available since 2010. The figure does not include those displaced from the Terai region since 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>There have never been any reliable estimates of the number of IDPs in Niger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>At least 1,075,300</td>
<td>975,300</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>The figure represents a compilation of assessments conducted using the displacement tracking matrix, reports from the National Emergency Management Agency and the National Commission for Refugees. It includes information on IDPs in 14 out of Nigeria’s 36 states, but does not include people displaced before 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>At least 1,900,000</td>
<td>Up to 907,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>The figure for north-west Pakistan is based on registered IDP families as reported by UNHCR. IDMC uses an average family size of 5.2 to calculate the total. Numbers for Balochistan are based on media sources and are only rough estimates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>At least 275,000</td>
<td>At least 118,200</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>The figure is based on secondary information and surveys that use different methodologies and only reflect ad hoc occurrences of displacement. It does not reflect the full scale of displacement. No organisation or mechanism monitors the number of IDPs systematically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>At least 7,500</td>
<td>At least 1,200</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>The figure is based on data collected in 2014 by various sources, including the government, ICRC and Amnesty International. No government or international agencies monitor displacement comprehensively and the figure only covers selected regions where data is available.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>At least 150,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>This is the last figure provided by the government. There are still 45,000 families who have applied to be included on a victims’ registry for IDPs, but whose applications have not yet been fully processed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>At least 77,700</td>
<td>At least 123,800</td>
<td>70,700</td>
<td>The figure is based on data collected by the Mindanao protection cluster, led by UNHCR. It includes people in government-recognised camps and relocation sites, displaced by armed conflict, clan violence and crime in Mindanao in 2014. IDPs in host communities and those living in protracted displacement are only partially included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>At least 25,400</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>The figure combines various sources with different methodologies and definitions of an IDP. It excludes IDPs living outside the North Caucasus and the many who never obtained “forced migrant” status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>There are no reliable estimates of the number of IDPs in Senegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>97,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The figure is the number of IDPs in need as determined by an assessment conducted by the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees, the Statistical Office of Serbia and UNHCR with the support of the Joint IDP Profiling Service in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,106,800</td>
<td>At least 89,000</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>Estimates are based on figures from UNHCR’s protection and return monitoring network, which it operates with its partners, and triangulated and endorsed by the Somalia humanitarian country team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1,498,200</td>
<td>At least 1,304,200</td>
<td>206,000</td>
<td>The figure for new IDPs in 2014 was 1,304,200, bringing the total figure to 1,498,200 since 15 December 2013. There is little information on whether people displaced before 2013 have found durable solutions, were displaced again or are still displaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Up to 90,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>The figure is based on a UNHCR compilation of government statistics from December 2012. Official reports indicate a decreasing number of IDPs, but no comprehensive durable solutions assessment has been undertaken to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>At least 3,100,000</td>
<td>At least 557,500</td>
<td>141,200</td>
<td>OCHA reported 3,300,000 as of 5 January 2015, including protracted and new displacement in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Only limited data on urban displacement as well as on durable solutions was available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>At least 900</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>The IDMC figure represents families evicted in 2011 from an abandoned police station in Dili, where they had settled after being displaced between 1999 and 2006. They have since moved to the Altarik Laran site, where they remain at risk of eviction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>At least 7,600,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is based on OCHA information gathered from the Syrian authorities, other UN agencies and NGOs in opposition areas. Sources use different methodologies to estimate the number of IDPs. The figure relies on 2007 data, the last credible information available. There are no UN or government figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Up to 35,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure relies on 2007 data, the last credible information available. There are no UN or government figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>At least 10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>There are no reliable estimates of the number of IDPs in Togo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>At least 963,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure draws on a 2006 study by Haceteppe University in Ankara, commissioned by the government, to determine that between 950,000 and 1.2 million people had been forced to flee their homes between 1986 and 2005. No more recent figures are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>At least 4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is an estimate of the number of people displaced by urban development or forcibly expelled because of their political affiliation or ethnicity. It is a compilation of information from various sources. No more recent figures are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Up to 29,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure includes IDPs assisted by UNHCR, but not people who fled to urban areas or who lived with host communities. The Uganda Human Rights Commission began an assessment of remaining camps at the end of 2014, but its findings were unavailable at the time of writing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Up to 36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure only covers people displaced by violence associated with the 2008 elections, as reported in the 2009 CAP. No other anecdotal evidence puts the number much higher. Most IDPs have reportedly been able to return to their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>At least 646,500</td>
<td>At least 646,500</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>The figure is based on official IDP registration figures from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. It also includes some registered IDPs who have approached authorities and NGOs for assistance and an estimated 10,000 IDPs who倩 confirmed by UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>At least 3,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is published in 2003, is an estimate by Human Rights Watch, IOM and other INGOs of the number of people forcibly relocated from nine villages in Sukhandaria province following government reports of armed incursions from Tajikistan by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. No more recent figures are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>334,100</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>214,400</td>
<td>The figure represents the number of IDPs the government and UNHCR had registered as of December, 2014. Does not include around 25,000 people who returned to their areas of origin, as they are counted as returns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Up to 36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The figure is an estimate of the number of IDPs in Zimbabwe. No more recent figures are available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. When the number of refugees who have fled the conflict in Syria are taken into account, the number of people who have been displaced internally represent an even larger portion (more than 40 per cent) of Syria’s inhabitants.


4. UARIV, *January to December, 2014*


6. Ibid


8. Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop), *Encuesta del pais a finales del 2014. Series de Informes No. 137, 16 to 25 November 2014*


20. Ibid


23. HRW, 2015, op. cit.

24. Ibid

25. OHCHR, *Observaciones finales sobre el informe presentado por México en virtud del artículo 29, párrafo 1, de la Convención, 13 February 2015*, available at: http://goopo.org/oYNRRS


27. http://goopo.org/Dno00 , last visited 15 February 2015


30. HRW, 2015, op. cit.


33. Aaron Korthuis, op. cit.

34. CGRS, *Niñez y migracion en Centro y Norte America: causas, politicas, practicas y desafios, 2015*, available at: http://goopo.org/kcFt0

35. Ibid

36. HRW 2015, Op CIt; Korthuis, Op Cit, p.17

37. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Análisis de fuentes de información existentes sobre migración y violencia en Honduras: Una perspectiva de desplazamiento forzado, 2013*

40. David Cantor, 2014, Op Cit
42. Reconciliacion Colombia, Los desplazados son más pobres que el resto de la población, 16 February 2015, available at: http://goo.gl/kcKF58
44. Ibid
45. Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral de las Víctimas, Informe analítico sobre la mediación de indicadores de gocce efectivo de derechos humanos de la población desplazada, January 2015, available at: http://goo.gl/ddXG31
46. UNHCR, 2015 UNHCR country operations profile – Colombia, available at: http://goo.gl/2a7r1S, last accessed on 26 March 2015
49. See: http://goo.gl/R8ZnBX, last visited 12 February 2015
51. +30 Cartagena, Brazil Declaration, 3 December 2014, available at: http://goo.gl/BNDA4t
52. The 2013 Constitutional ruling (award 119) that people displaced by BACRIM should be included in the victims’ registry prompted many IDPs to come forward. This, however, has had the effect of reducing their visibility as they are now considered as “one of many victims’ groups”. Brookings, Changing Times: The International Response to Internal Displacement in Colombia, 12 January 2015, available at: http://goo.gl/oz43c3
53. Maite de Muller, UNHCR TSI report indicates that 52 per cent of IDPs live in urban areas
54. From January to May 2014, 382 armed incidents occurred, compared with 907 over the same period in 2013. Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, La tercera tregua: una comparación del cese unilateral de hostilidades de las FARC, 28 May 2014, available at: http://goo.gl/e1QoQg
59. Land Restitution Unit, Informe trimestral de gestión, available at: http://goo.gl/QZ9e4s
60. CDDHES, Boletín de síntesis del conflicto armado y crisis humanitaria por desplazamiento forzado en zonas microfocalizadas para restitución de tierras y derechos territoriales, 2014, available at: http://goo.gl/U4O06G
62. Ibid
63. According to Amnesty International, “paramilitaries, often working with others with a political and/or economic interest in the land being claimed, as well as drug trafficking gangs, have been primarily responsible for threats against and killings of land claimants and land activists”. At least 30 human rights defenders were killed in the first half of 2014 and more that 100 threatened. Ibid
64. Integral Unit for Victims’ Attention and Reparation, Informe analítico sobre la mediación de indicadores de gocce efectivo de derecho de la población desplazada, no date, available at: http://goo.gl/13ZOFq
67. OCHA, South Sudan Crisis – Situation Report No. 69, 8 January 2015, available at: http://goo.gl/XyB3NL
69. Ibid
71. Ibid
79. UN Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS PoC Update No. 56, 2 January 2015, available at: http://goo.gl/9RGGYr
83. UN News Centre, DR Congo: UN refugee agency concerned at sudden closure of displaced persons camp, 5 December 2014, available at: http://goo.gl/mLRyB9
84. South Sudan Protection Cluster, op. cit.
85. UNHCR, December 2014, op. cit.
86. UNHCR and Government of Burundi, Enregistrement d'intention des PDIs, July 2014
87. UN Human Rights Council, Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21, 6 August 2014, available at: http://goo.gl/5w5TAz
92. OCHA, September 2014, op. cit.
93. Ibid
95. Ibid
108. Ibid
114. IDMC correspondence with the Direction Nationale du Développement Social, February 2015
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